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I. INTRODUCTION

Health care providers and tort reformers invariably claim that
the medical malpractice litigation system is rife with behaviors that
are irrational, unpredictable, and counter-productive. They attack
civil juries, asserting that verdicts are skyrocketing without reason,
are highly variable, and bear little or no relation to the merits of
plaintiffs' claims. They complain about patients, arguing that the few
with valid claims sue rarely, while the many who receive nonnegligent treatment sue all the time. They attack greedy lawyers,
alleging that they rake in obscene profits by routinely filing frivolous
complaints. They complain that compensation flows almost randomly,
winding up in the hands of patients who were treated non-negligently
as often as (or even more often than) it reaches patients with valid
complaints. They argue that the tort system does a poor job of
distinguishing real victims from phony ones, claiming that it no more
discourages malpractice than a police officer would discourage
speeding by ticketing drivers randomly.
Instead of motivating
providers to do better, the system supposedly paralyzes them with
fear and causes them to hide their mistakes.
Many of the preceding claims are facially implausible. The
medical malpractice liability system is an enormous market whose
principal trading partners-trial lawyers and liability insurers-are
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sophisticated, economically-oriented repeat players. They run the
system, and they have the knowledge and incentives to select efficient
means to accomplish their respective ends. Given this backdrop, their
behavior and the behavior of the system they administer should not be
random, or even particularly hard to explain. Nor, given the absence
of market power and barriers to entry, should attorneys earn more
than market-driven returns on the services they provide.
Most of the preceding claims are also inconsistent with
empirical studies of the medical malpractice liability system. These
studies, which now constitute a substantial body of research, depict a
system that is stable and predictable, that sorts valid from invalid
claims reasonably well, and that responds mainly to changes in the
frequency of errors and the cost of dealing with them. The system
does have a number of pathologies, however, including its loading
costs, the snail's pace at which it processes claims, and its failure to
compensate patients injured by medical negligence as fully and as
often as it should.
It is possible to reform the liability system to address these
shortcomings, but tort reform proposals like caps on non-economic
damages and attorneys fees will not do so. The goal of these proposals
is to reduce insurance prices by making the system less remunerative
for claimants.
If implemented, these measures will predictably
worsen the problem of under-compensation by limiting the remedies
available to patients with serious injuries and by reducing the number
of valid claims that are sufficiently profitable for attorneys to pursue.
They will also weaken providers' incentives to protect patients from
avoidable perils.
In this Article, we review the findings of empirical research
into matters internal to the medical malpractice litigation process,
including studies we have produced or are working on currently.'
These studies demonstrate that the medical malpractice litigation
system is both stable and predictable. We argue that economic
incentives account for the tendencies and patterns the studies report.
However, the empirical findings are what they are, whether or not our
1.
See generally David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, The Poor State of Health Care Quality
in the U.S.: Is MalpracticeLiability Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?, 90 CORNELL L.
REV. 893 (2005) [hereinafter Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution]; David A. Hyman &
Charles Silver, Speak Not of Error, REGULATION, Mar.-Apr. 2005, at 52; David A. Hyman &
Charles Silver, Medical Malpractice Reform Redux: D&jI vu All Over Again?, 12 WIDENER L.J.
121 (2005); David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, Believing Six Improbable Things: Medical
Malpracticeand "Legal Fear" 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 107 (2004); David A. Hyman, Medical
Malpractice and the Tort System: What Do We Know and What (If Anything) Should We Do
About It?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1639 (2002). In this Article, we do not discuss the effects of lawsuits on
defensive medicine or access to care. We have written about these subjects elsewhere.
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incentive-based explanations are correct. We therefore summarize the
literature first and then offer our explanation for the patterns we
observe.
Part II addresses the frequency with which patients bring
malpractice suits. Part III considers the accuracy with which the
malpractice system sorts claims. Part IV examines the frequency of
frivolous complaints.
Part V addresses the correlation between
patients' injuries and the amount of compensation they receive. Part
VI focuses on trends in payment frequencies and amounts over time.
Part VII examines the rate at which plaintiffs win medical
malpractice trials. Part VIII offers an incentive-based explanation of
the behaviors and phenomena outlined in Parts II through VII. Part
IX proposes various reforms, based on the evidence presented in the
balance of the Article, and Part X concludes.

II. How OFTEN Do PATIENTS SUE?
It seems appropriate to begin a tour of the empirical literature
on the malpractice system with studies of patient litigiousness. Those
steeped in the rhetoric of tort reform may think it unnecessary to
explore this topic, since they "know" that Americans will sue at the
drop of a hat.2 Americans' reputation for litigiousness is so firmly
established that obstetricians joke about being sued when a child they
delivered doesn't get into Harvard. 3 Foreigners refer to personal injury
4
lawsuits as "the American disease."

2.
See, e.g., TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 19-21 (2005) (cataloging seven
myths of medical malpractice, including alleged litigiousness of Americans); John Engler & Dan
Pero, End Jackpot Justice, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2005, at A17 ("Jackpot justice has saddled
America with the most expensive tort system in the world. . . . Our lawsuit-happy culture is a
growing disadvantage for U.S. businesses that must compete in a global marketplace.");
American College of Surgeons, The Medical Liability Crisis and the Litigation Explosion,
http://www.facs.org/ahp/litexplosion.html (last visited May 31, 2006) ("Across the nation, doctors
are facing staggering increases in medical liability premiums. . . . The reason? The rising
number of meritless lawsuits filed each year and the concentration of those cases in tort friendly
states.").
3.
Cf. Edward Martin, Critical Condition, BUS. N.C., June 2004, available at http://www.
businessnc.com/archives/2004/07/malpractice.html ("If your kid doesn't get into Harvard or
Duke, you can come back to us and claim something happened at birth.").
4.
Charles Fleming, Ireland Curbs 'American Disease'-PersonalInjury Lawsuits, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 25, 2005, at B1. A comparative study not limited to personal injury suits found that
the U.S. trailed Germany, Sweden, Israel, and Austria in lawsuits per capita and differed little
from the United Kingdom and Denmark. See Herbert Kritzer, Lawyer Fees and Lawyer Behavior
in Litigation: What Does the EmpiricalLiterature Really Say?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1943, 1982 (2002)
(reproducing chart of litigation rates found in Christian Wollschlager, Exploring Global
Landscapes of Litigation Rates, in SOCIOLOGIE DES RECHTS: FESTSCHRIFT FUR ERHARD
BLANKENBURG ZUM 60,60 (Jurgen Brand & Dieter Strempel eds., 1998)).
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Empirical studies, however, provide little evidence that injured
Americans rush to the courts:
Research typically shows [that] Americans rarely take their disputes to court. Of every
one hundred Americans injured in an accident, only ten make a liability claim, and only
two file a lawsuit. Of every one hundred Americans who believe they have lost more
than $1,000 because of someone else's illegal conduct, only five file a suit ....
Far from a
nation of litigators, the United States seems to be filled with "lumpers," people inclined
to lump their grievances rather than press them... Some researchers even believe that
Americans are no more innately lawsuit prone than the Japanese, the supposed saints
5
of nonlitigiousness.

Indeed, the frequency of tort filings per 1,000 Americans reached its
apex in 1990 but declined by 5 percent between 1993 and 2002.6 By
contrast, the rate of contract filings rose during the same period,
reflecting either the growing number of American businesses (after
controlling for population) or their growing litigiousness.
Are patients eager to sue? Or are they reluctant, like other tort
victims? Popular perceptions notwithstanding, the evidence is quite
clear that while many patients are injured, few ever sue. At the
highest level, one can compare the estimated number of medical
injuries-more than one million per year-to the number of
malpractice
lawsuits filed nationwide-approximately
85,000
7
annually.
With about ten times as many injuries as malpractice
claims,. the only conclusion possible is that injured patients rarely file
lawsuits.8
Three major studies also examined patient litigiousness, using
data from four different states. The first evaluated the frequency of
negligence among patients hospitalized in twenty-three representative
California hospitals during 1974. One percent of the patients studied

5.
THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS: THE BATTLE OVER
LITIGATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 3 (2002). To be sure, the frequency of claiming is affected by
numerous factors, including,knowledge, social norms, injury severity, ease of access to counsel,
and the presence of insurance. On "lumping it," see generally Allen R. Meyers, Lumping It: The
Hidden Denominator of the Medical MalpracticeCrisis, 77 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1544 (1987).
6.
BRIAN OSTROM, NEAL KAUDER & NEIL LAFOUNTAIN, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE
COURTS 23 (2003). Interestingly, this source indicates that the number of malpractice claims
went up by six percent from 1998 to 2002. However, the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC) reported a four percent decline, from 90,212 malpractice claims in 1995
to 86,480 in 2000. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, STATISTICAL
COMPILATION OF ANNUAL STATEMENT INFORMATION FOR PROPERTY/CASUALTY INSURANCE
COMPANIES (2001) (on file with author).
7.
Id.
8.
Insurers settle a modest number of claims without a lawsuit being filed, but not enough
to materially affect the figure in the text. David A. Hyman et al., Tort Reform and the Pretrial
Litigation Process: Evidence From Texas Medical Malpractice Cases, 1988-2003 (May 31, 2006)
(unpublished draft, on file with authors).
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were negligently injured. Extrapolating statewide, negligent injuries
exceeded malpractice claims filed in California by a factor of ten. 9
The second major study, the Harvard Medical Practice Study
("HMPS"), used a similar methodology, but focused on hospitalizations
in fifty-one hospitals in New York during 1984.10
The HMPS
concluded that 1 percent of hospitalized patients suffered a negligent
injury and the total number of negligent injuries was 6.7 times the
number of state-wide malpractice claims. More importantly, these
researchers matched cases of negligent injury with actual claim
filings, and determined that only 2 percent of those who were
negligently injured filed a claim."
A related team of authors conducted the third major study,
focusing on hospitalizations in Colorado and Utah in 1992.12 This
study found roughly comparable figures for negligent injury (0.8
percent (Colorado) and 0.9 percent (Utah) of hospitalized patients),
ratios of negligent injuries to state-wide claim filings (5.1:1 (Colorado)
13
and 6.7:1 (Utah)) and matched claim filings (2.5 percent).
Other findings are consistent with these results. For example,
from 1996 through 1999, Florida hospitals reported 19,885 incidents of
medical negligence to a state agency, but patients filed only 3,177 new
medical malpractice claims. Thus, the total number of hospitalreported negligent incidents was 6.3 times the number of state-wide
malpractice claims.' 4 Because under-reporting of such incidents is

9.

See Don Harper Mills, Medical Insurance Feasibility Study, 128 W.J. MED. 360, 363

(1978); see also CALIFORNIA MED. ASS'N & CALIFORNIA HoSP. ASS'N, REPORT ON THE MEDICAL
INSURANCE FEASIBILITY STUDY (Don H. Mills ed., 1977); PATRICIA DANZON, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 4 (1985).

10. The HMPS resulted in two books and numerous articles in medical, legal, and health
policy journals. See Hyman, supra note 1, at 1641-42 n.6.
11. See Troyen A. Brennan et al., Incidence of Adverse Events and Negligence in
Hospitalized Patients, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 370, 371 (1991) (noting that the likelihood of a
claim was substantially higher when the injury was more severe).
12. See David M. Studdert et al., Negligent Care and Malpractice Claiming Behavior in
Utah and Colorado, 38 MED. CARE 250, 250-60 (2000); Eric J. Thomas et al., Incidence and
Types of Adverse Events and Negligent Care in Utah and Colorado, 38 MED. CARE 261, 261-71
(2000); Eric J. Thomas et al., Costs of Medical Injuries in Utah and Colorado, 36 INQUIRY 255,
255-64 (1999).
13. Studdert, supra note 12, at 255; see also Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan,
Deterrenceof Medical Errors:Theory and Evidence for MalpracticeReform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595,
1619 (2002).
14. FLORIDA AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, DIVISION OF HEALTH QUALITY
ASSURANCE, REPORTED MALPRACTICE CLAIMS BY DISTRICT COMPARED TO REPORTED ADVERSE
INCIDENTS 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 (on file with authors). In 2004, there were 6,456 incidents
reported, but only 1,068 new malpractice claims - meaning that malpractice claims were only
16% of reported incidents. See FLORIDA AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, DIVISION OF
HEALTH QUALITY ASSURANCE, REPORTED MALPRACTICE CLAIMS BY DISTRICT COMPARED TO
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common, and the study did not include negligent incidents in the
outpatient setting, the actual ratio of negligence to malpractice claims
is undoubtedly much higher. Additionally, an observational study of
patients in a single hospital in Chicago found that only 1.2 percent of
patients who experienced a medical error made a claim. 15 Another
study focused on birth injuries in Florida in 1987 that resulted in
death or permanent injury. 16 Of 220 women whose babies suffered
serious injuries or died, only twenty-three sought legal advice and
none sued.
There are also anecdotal reports of such forbearance. A recent
mass market book on medical errors recounts the story of a man who
was injured in an automobile crash.1 7 He was hospitalized and placed
in a semi-private room alongside a patient with diabetes. The
attending nurse forgot which patient was which and gave the injured
man insulin. He fell into a coma and suffered a lasting brain injury,
18
but he refused to sue because he liked the nurse.
Although many negligently injured patients do not sue, some
patients sue even though their injuries were not caused by provider
negligence. The frequency of such filings and the frequency with
which they lead to payments are discussed in Parts III and V.
Thus, whether one is looking at cross-national comparisons of
litigiousness,1 9 or the rate of litigation relative to the incidence of

REPORTED ADVERSE INCIDENTS 2004, available at http://ahca.myflorida.comMCHQ[HealthFacilityRegulationlRiskldocuments/2004_MalpracticeByAreaHospital.pdf.
15. Lori B. Andrews, Studying Medical Error in Situ: Implications For Malpractice Law
and Policy, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 357, 370 (2005); Lori B. Andrews et al., An Alternative Strategy
for Studying Adverse Events in Medical Care, 349 LANCET 309, 309 (1997). One complication is
that the definition of medical error in this study does not map as neatly onto the legal definition
of negligent treatment as the other studies.
16. Frank A. Sloan & Chee Ruey Hsieh, Injury, Liability, and the Decision to File a Medical
Malpractice Claim, 29 LAW. & SOC. REV. 413, 413-35 (1995).
17. ROSEMARY GIBSON & JANARDAN P. SINGH, WALL OF SILENCE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF
THE MEDICAL MISTAKES THAT KILL AND INJURE MILLIONS OF AMERICANS 128-29 (2003).

18. Empirical studies find that patients are reluctant to sue providers they like, and that
communication skills are an important factor in whether patients like their providers. See
Gerald B. Hickson et al., Obstetricians'Prior Malpractice Experience and Patients' Satisfaction
with Care, 272 JAMA 1583, 1583 (1994); Gerald B. Hickson et al., Factors that Prompted
Families to File Medical Malpractice Claims Following PerinatalInjuries, 267 JAMA 1359, 1359
(1992) [hereinafter Factorsthat Prompted Families].
19. It is difficult to compare the litigiousness of malpractice victims in the U.S. and other
countries, but other countries have experienced spectacular growth in claims in recent years. See
MAKING AMENDS: A CONSULTATION PAPER SETTING OUT PROPOSALS FOR REFORMING THE
APPROACH TO CLINICAL NEGLIGENCE IN THE NHS 58 (2003) (reporting "a nearly fifteen-fold
increase in the number of claims" handled by the National Health Service Litigation Authority
from 1996/97 to 2002/03). Some also believe that other countries have similar rates of
malpractice litigation. Daniel Cappello, Bad Medicine, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 11, 2005,
available at http://www.newyorker.com/online/contentarticles/051114on-onlineonly01
('The
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injury, Americans are not "suit-happy." The medical malpractice
system experiences both substantial under-claiming (by patients who
deserve payment but do not sue) and substantial over-claiming (by
patients who sue but do not deserve payment).
Although both
problems are significant, the former dwarfs the latter. 20 Indeed, if
anything, "the medical setting has provided the strongest evidence
that the real tort crisis may consist in too few claims." 2' The next Part
discusses how effectively the legal system sorts through this mix of
cases, and the following section addresses whether the observed
degree of over-claiming is attributable to frivolous litigation.

III. DO THE MERITS

MATTER?

Critics of the tort system argue that it is essentially random,
using language like "jackpot justice" and "lawsuit lottery" to describe
the manner in which the system allocates payments. 22 The basic
major difference between malpractice here and in Great Britain and Canada turns out not to be
in the number of lawsuits. At this point, the U.K. and Canada seem to be catching up with our
rate of lawsuits.") (quoting Atul Gawande).
20. Hyman, supra note 1, at 1643; see also ROBERT M. WACHTER & KAVEH G. SHOJANIA,
INTERNAL BLEEDING 305 (2004).
21. PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE
LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION 62 (1993) (emphasis in original).

22. See, e.g., Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Juries and Justice: Are Malpractice and Other
PersonalInjuries Created Equal?, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 6 (1991) ("A major complaint of
well-insured defendants, especially physicians, is that juries are biased against defendants,
especially those with 'deep pockets.' This availability of funds allegedly encourages easier
awards of higher damages for similar injuries and hence the bringing of less meritorious
claims."); Troyen A. Brennan & Philip K. Howard, Editorial, Heal the Law, Then Health Care,
WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2004, at B07 ("Justice today... is basically random.... Meritorious cases
often lose or are settled on the cheap. . . . [D]octors who did nothing wrong are often hit with
huge verdicts."); AMERICAN

ASSOCIATION OF HEALTH PLANS, "LAWSUIT LOTTERY"

CAUSES

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CRISIS, available at http://www.americanbenefitscouncil.org/documents/
refutingstockmarketargument.pdf.; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, OFFICE
OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR PLANNING AND EVALUATION, ADDRESSING THE NEW HEALTH
CARE CRISIS: REFORMING THE MEDICAL LITIGATION SYSTEM TO IMPROVE QUALITY OF HEALTH

CARE (Mar. 3, 2003), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/medliab.htm (referring to
"jackpot judgment[s]" and the "litigation lottery"); AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, MEDICAL
LIABILITY REFORM-NOW! 35, 51 (on file with authors) (discussing the "lawsuit lottery" theory).
The President of Johns Hopkins University has been a particularly enthusiastic proponent of
these claims:
This is the real problem with our system of malpractice litigation. I call it the medical
lottery: it randomly awards outsized payments to a lucky few, and fails to help in any
way the far greater number whose needs are every bit as great, but whose luck or
timing or ability to manipulate the system are not as finely honed.
William Brody, President, The Johns Hopkins University, Manhattan Institute for Policy
Research Luncheon: Is the Legal System Killing Healthcare? (Feb. 25, 2003), available at
http://web.jhu.edu/president/speeches/2003/legalsys.htm; William R. Brody, Editorial, Dispelling
Malpractice Myths, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2004, at B07 ('The medical justice system today is
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claim is that payments bear little or no relation to the merits of
claims. This argument is frequently bolstered with anecdotes (Heard
about the woman who got a million bucks because a CT scan "erased"
her psychic powers?), and complaints about the irrationality of noneconomic damages. Critics routinely cite a finding in the HMPS that a
substantial percentage of cases in which payment is made do not
23
actually involve negligent treatment.
As Table 1 reflects, any system for making compensation
determinations will generate four kinds of results: true positives (cell
1), false positives (cell 2), false negatives (cell 3), and true negatives
(cell 4). True positives and true negatives occur, respectively, when
people entitled to payments receive them and when people not entitled
to payments do not. False positives and false negatives occur, again
respectively, when persons not entitled to payments receive them and
when persons entitled to payments are turned down. True positives
and true negatives are correct results. False positives and false
negatives are mistakes. The goal is to maximize the number of cases
in cells 1 and 4, and minimize the number of cases in cells 2 and 3.
Expressed in dollar terms, the goal is to concentrate payouts in cell 1
and to minimize the amounts paid out for cases in cell 2 and not paid
out for cases in cell 3.
Table 1: A Typology of Correct and Erroneous Malpractice
Liability Payments
Injured by
Substandard Care?

Compensated?
Yes

No

Yes

True Positive (Cell 1)

False Negative (Cell 3)

No

False Positive (Cell 2)

True Negative (Cell 4)

mostly random; it has become essentially a lottery. . . . Juries often deliver sizable awards
against providers who commit no errors for what are unfavorable, but random, outcomes of
nature.")
23. As one of us noted in an earlier article,
Once cases are filed, the tort system does a fair job of sorting the wheat from the chaff,
but in an appreciable percentage of cases, it reaches the 'wrong' decision-i.e.,
awarding damages when there was no negligence or adverse event, and not awarding
damages when there was negligence. Indeed, the best predictor of the size of an award
is the severity of disability, not whether there was negligence, or an adverse event.
Hyman, supra note 1, at 1642. As this Article notes, the last sentence in this description is based
on the HMPS; other studies paint a more favorable picture of the performance of the tort system.
Id. at 1642, n.13. To be sure, such complaints are not unique to medical malpractice litigation.
See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991).
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This Part evaluates how well the medical malpractice system
performs against these goals. We draw heavily on a recent article by
Professor Tom Baker which both summarizes the literature and
incisively criticizes the portion of the HMPS that has been cited in
support of the "lawsuit lottery" claim. 24 This Part also discusses a
successor study to the HMPS that strongly supports Professor Baker's
views but appeared after his article was written. 25 The bottom line is
that a strong correlation exists between the likelihood of receiving
payment and the merits of malpractice claims. The HMPS, the only
study to find the contrary, is unreliable on this point, for reasons
Professor Baker carefully explains.
The first important point is that when the tort is medical
malpractice, one must sue to be paid, and one must find a lawyer in
order to sue. In our database of medical malpractice claims in Texas,
from 1988 to 2003, 98.5 percent of claimants who obtained payments
exceeding $10,000 (in nominal dollars) employed attorneys. 26 Only 1.5
percent of claimants represented themselves, and only a tiny fraction
of these claimants (0.1 percent of the total) commenced litigation. In
all, our dataset of 13,663 claims that closed with payment contains
seventeen pro se lawsuits-about one per year.
In the rare instances where the provider pays without
litigation, it is usually because the provider admits negligence,
meaning the claims are true positives. Recent initiatives encouraging
providers to apologize and pay compensation may cause the frequency
of voluntary payments to grow, but such payments are very much the
27
exception today.
The second important point is that when patients do sue, the
malpractice system sorts their claims relatively well. Table 2 briefly
summarizes the studies Professor Baker reviewed, excluding the
HMPS.

24. Tom Baker, Reconsidering the Harvard Medical Practice Study Conclusions about the
Validity of Medical Malpractice Claims, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 501, 502-06 (2005).
25. David M. Studdert et al., Claims, Errors and Compensation Payments in Medical
Malpractice Litigation, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2024 (2006). We are grateful to David Studdert
and Michelle Mello for sharing a preliminary version of their study.
26. For a description of the dataset, see Bernard Black et al., Medical Malpractice Claim
Outcomes in Texas, 1988-2002, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 207, 213-22 (2005). The figure
reported in the text is for the NAR dataset, which includes all claims in which the business class
was a doctor, hospital, or nursing home, the insurance type was medical professional liability,
and the cause of injury was a medical or surgical procedure. Both of the authors of the present
article were co-authors of that article.
27. See Hyman & Silver, Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution, supra note 1, at 943.
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Table 2: Summary of Studies of the Accuracy of the Malpractice
System
Study

Database

Reviewers

Correlation between
Negligence and Payments

Ogbum et al., St.
Paul Insurance
Company
Obstetrics
Claims Study
Rosenblatt and
Hurst,
Physicians
Mutual
Obstetrics
Claims Study

153 closed claims
involving serious
permanent injury
or death to a baby

Obstetricians

Patients received payments in 90% of
the cases in which the physician was
found to have been negligent.

33 lawsuits
involving
obstetrics claims

Rosenblatt

Cheney et al.,
Anesthesiologist
Closed Claim
Review

869 closed claims
against
anesthesiologists

Anesthesiologists

No indemnity payments in nonmeritorious cases. In cases with
payments, "there was general
consensus among insurance company
staff, medical experts, defense
attorneys and the physician defendants
that some lapse in standard of care
contributed to the observed outcome."
Payments made in 82% of the
instances in which care was
inappropriate, and in 42% of the
instances in which care was

Farber and
White, Single
Hospital Study

252 malpractice
cases against a
single hospital

Confidential
experts
retained by
the hospital

appropriate. The amount paid was
strongly correlated to negligence and
injury type.
Care quality and outcomes were
strongly related. Claimants were paid
in 89% of the "bad" care cases, 25% of
the "good" care cases, and 69% of the
"ambiguous" cases. The hospitals'
expected liability was 25 times as high
on average in a "bad" care case as in a
"good" care case.

Sloan and Hsieh,
Florida Closed
Claims I

1549 closed
claims against
ob-gyns, general
surgeons, and
orthopedic
surgeons

Physicians

"[C]ases involving a higher appearance
of fault were more likely to be paid,"
and payment amount correlated
positively with injury severity.
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Sloan et al.,
Florida Closed
Claims II

127 birth injury
cases and 60
emergency room
cases

Four panels of
physicians

"No negligence" claims were most
likely to have been voluntarily dropped
with no payment, "negligence" claims
were most likely to have been settled
with a payment, and claims with split
or uncertain determinations were more
mixed.

Taragin et al.,
New Jersey
Closed Claim
Study

8231 claims
closed a large
malpractice
insurer

Insurer
interviewed

Strong correlation between carriers'
evaluations and outcomes. Claimants

defendant
physician, had
claim
representative

received payments in 91% of the
indefensible cases, 21% of the
defensible cases, and 59% of the
unclear cases. Injury severity did not

assess the
claim, and
obtained peer
review for any
case that the
claims
representative
did not
conclude was
clearly
defensible
Internal
assessment
made by
hospital's risk
managers

affect the likelihood of payment, but
did affect payment amounts in cases in
which payments were made.

Spurr and
Howze,
Michigan Single
Hospital Study

165 closed claims
against a hospital
in Michigan

Fault was only statistically significant
factor affecting likelihood that claim
was dropped; fault and injury severity
affected claim size, with fault being
more important.
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87 closed claims
involving a
hospital or
physician covered
by a cooperating
liability insurer

Insurer's initial
and final
liability
assessments,
including its
assessment of
whether the
standard of
care was
breached, and
whether
defendant's
conduct caused
harm;
consensus of
outside experts
engaged by the
insurer
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Insurer offered to settle in 96% of the
cases in which it concluded that the
standard of care was breached;
plaintiffs received money in 93% of
those cases. Plaintiffs received money
in only 15% of the cases in which the
insurer concluded that the standard of
care was not breached and in 37% of
the cases in which the insurer was
uncertain.

Although these studies vary in quality and robustness, the
consistency of the findings is impressive. 28 All find that the merits
matter, and some find that the merits matter more than anything
else. Plaintiffs who received substandard care generally obtained
compensation (cell 1); plaintiffs who received proper care generally did
not (cell 4); and plaintiffs whose care quality was uncertain wound up
in between. The malpractice system does not sort cases perfectly, but
perfection is an unrealistic standard. As Sloan and his co-authors
observe, "To the extent that there is highly incomplete knowledge
about the effect of particular interventions by health care providers on
outcomes, it is unrealistic to expect courts to be omniscient in this
29
regard."

28. Professor Baker omitted another closed claim study that yielded similar findings. See
Patricia Munch Danzon & Lee A. Lillard, Settlement Out of Court: The Disposition of Medical
Malpractice Claims, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 345, 369 (1983) ("[Ihe settlement process is not random
with respect to which cases are paid: cases more likely to win in court are more likely to win out
of court.").
29. See Frank A. Sloan, Policy Implications, in SUING FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 219, 219
(Frank A. Sloan et al. eds., 1993). On variation in expert medical opinion regarding treatment
quality and causation, see Ralph Peeples et al., The Process of Managing Medical Malpractice
Cases: The Role of Standard of Care, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 877, 884 (2002) (finding that
independent reviewers hired to evaluate claims by insurers disagreed 34.3% of the time); K.L.
Posner et al., Variation in Expert Opinion in Medical Malpractice Review, 85 ANESTHESIOLOGY
1049, 1051-52 (1996) (noting that anesthesiologists disagreed on whether care was negligent
38% of the time because they used implicit standards of review instead of explicit criteria).
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What then should be made of the HMPS findings that payment
and negligence are effectively uncorrelated, and disability is a better
predictor of payment than negligence? As Professor Baker explains,
this finding is problematic for a number of reasons, including:
*
The finding was based on an examination of forty-seven
malpractice claims, a sample smaller than any study in the
table save one.
*
The HMPS employed an extremely conservative scoring
system that was designed to "provid[e] a solid, lower bound
estimate of the rate of those [negligent] injuries ... that
30
would be trusted by medical providers."
*
The HMPS assigned all cases in which reviewers
disagreed about care quality to the non-negligent category.
Tests using multiple reviewers showed that reviewers often
disagreed about care quality in particular cases where
patients were identified as having sustained care-related
31
injuries.
*
The HMPS examined only the hospital records in
making the determination as to whether care was negligent
or not. Many errors do not appear in hospital records.
They may be left out intentionally or inadvertently, or they
may involve shortcomings like failure to diagnose of which
no record can be made. Evidence of negligent treatment
provided on an outpatient basis is similarly unlikely to be
32
in the hospital medical record.
*
When one looks at the reviewers' assessments, one finds
that the HMPS actually provides evidence of a strong
connection between care quality and the likelihood that
33
patients will file malpractice claims.

30. Baker, supranote 24, at 503.
31. Id. at 504.
32. It is important not to overstate the significance of this observation. Hospital record
review is the benchmark standard for these types of studies.
33. Id. Baker also notes that:
[A] patient whose hospital record provided the strongest evidence of medical
malpractice was twenty[-]two times more likely to make a claim than the average
patient, eight times more likely to make a claim than all other patients with
sufficiently strong evidence of a medical management injury to reach the second stage
of the HMPS review, and two and a half times more likely to make a claim than all
other patients the HMPS physicians determined to have suffered a medical
management injury.
Id. at 506. This is hardly a picture of malpractice claiming run amok. See also Michelle M. Mello
& David Hemenway, Medical Malpracticeas an EpidemiologicalProblem, 59 Soc. SCi. MED. 39,
42-43 (2004).
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Because its sample size was so small, outlier cases
strongly affected the HMPS's reports of payment means for
claims involving different levels of care quality.
Reclassifying a few close cases causes the differences
between the HMPS and the studies summarized in the
table to disappear, and turns the HMPS into yet another
study showing that the malpractice system sorts cases
34
reasonably well.
*
The HMPS's treatment of cases in which hospitals wrote
off their bills prejudiced its logistic regression against a
finding that negligence predicted the likelihood of
35
payments.
Although HMPS researchers noted many of these
*
shortcomings in early publications, they did not emphasize
them in later works and the study's weaknesses gradually
dropped out of the policy debate. 36 Not surprisingly, tort
reform advocates emphasize the over-claiming findings of
the HMPS and ignore the under-claiming findings and the
37
limitations of the study.
A more recent study completed by researchers at the Harvard
School of Public Health, one of whom participated in the HMPS,
confirms that the medical malpractice system does a surprisingly good
job of differentiating between plaintiffs who should and should not
receive compensation. 38 Instead of relying on hospital records, as the
HMPS did, this study reviewed closed claim files randomly selected
from five insurance companies operating in different parts of the
*

34. Baker, supra note 24, at 507.
35. Id. at 508.
36. Id.
37. Ted Frank provides a clear example of a tort reform advocate who relies on the HMPS
without noting its limitations. In a posting dated May 2, 2005, he writes:
The Harvard Study found that ... the litigation system was just as likely to award
damages in a case where no medical malpractice has taken place as one where
medical malpractice has taken place; indeed, the sued non-negligent doctors paid
more on average to injured patients than the sued negligent doctors, and the majority
of patients receiving compensation weren't injured by negligence.
Posting of Ted Frank to Point of Law Blog, http://www.pointoflaw.com/archives/001122.php (May
2, 2005, 23:08 EST). Mr. Frank mentions no limitations in the quote or elsewhere in his post.
The omission is ironic given that Frank was responding to a post by Professor Michael Saks, who
pointed out some of the HMPS's failings in an early book review. See Michael Saks, Medical
Malpractice: Facing Real Problems and Finding Real Solutions, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 693,
710-13 (1994) (book review). For another example of tort reformers' use of the HMPS to support
the charge of over-claiming, see AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 22 (asserting that
"a substantial majority of malpractice claims filed are not based on actual provider carelessness,"
and citing the HMPS).
38. See Studdert et al., supranote 25.
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country. The files contained the complete claim file, including medical
records and litigation-related materials, with expert opinions from
both sides. 39 The methodology they employed was similar to that in
the HMPS and the studies of Colorado and Utah previously described.
Their findings are consistent with those reported in the studies
summarized in Table 2 and inconsistent with the HMPS.
In particular, they found that the "right" result (i.e., true
positives and true negatives) was reached about 73% of the time, with
"error claims" accounting for 64% of all claims and 84% of total
indemnity payments. A false negative (no payment in an error claim)
was 1.6 times more likely than a false positive (payment in a non-error
claim). Payment in non-error claims averaged 60 percent of the
amounts paid for error claims. 0 As the conclusion of the article
reflects, "the vast majority of expenditures go toward litigation over
errors and payment of them."4 '
To summarize, the merits of a claim are the best predictor of
the likelihood of payment and the amount received.

IV. How COMMON ARE FRIVOLOUS MALPRACTICE LAWSUITS?
When stumping for caps on malpractice liability, President
George W. Bush routinely blames frivolous lawsuits for the medical
malpractice crisis. 42 He is far from alone in lodging this complaint.
Health care providers have denounced frivolous malpractice lawsuits
for years, and complaints about frivolous cases are common currency
in tort reform circles. Consider one revealing example. On the eve of
the 2002 election, Texas Republicans mailed out an advertisement
(attached as Appendix A) claiming that "86% of lawsuits filed by
personal injury trial lawyers against Texas doctors & nurses are
frivolous," with the word "frivolous" enlarged and highlighted. This
willingness to quantify the percentage of lawsuits that are frivolous is
unusual. 43 Until fairly recently, no academic study quantified the
39.

Id.

40.

Id. at 2029.

41.

Id. at 2024.

42. Warren Vieth, Bush Hammers Medical Malpractice Suits, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2005, at
A17 ("What's happening all across this country is that lawyers are filing baseless suits against
hospitals and doctors . . . . They know the medical liability system is tilted in their favor."
(quoting President George W. Bush)); see also Peter Baker, Bush Campaigns to Curb Lawsuits;
President Says 'Junk' Litigation is Driving Small-town Doctors Out of Business, WASH. POST,
Jan. 6, 2005, at A6 ("America's health care professionals should be focused on fighting illnesses,
not on fighting lawsuits. Junk lawsuits change the way docs do their job. Instead of trying to
heal the patients, doctors try not to get sued." (quoting President George W. Bush)).
43. But hardly unique. See, e.g., AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 22, at 53
(asserting that "[t]he vast majority of claims-almost 70 percent-have no merit").
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number of frivolous complaints in any area of civil litigation. 44
Academics who write about frivolous lawsuits generally concede that
45
there is no evidence indicating they are a serious problem.
Furthermore, most judges believe that frivolous lawsuits are a minor
46
problem, according to a recent survey by the Federal Judicial Center.
Texas Republicans relied on a Medical Liability Study
conducted by the Texas Medical Association ("TMA") to support their
claim that 86 percent of medical malpractice lawsuits are frivolous.
However, the TMA study states that "[t]he percentage of claims closed
with no indemnity paid increased to 86%" in 2000-an entirely
different assertion.4 7
First, the assertion concerns claims, not
lawsuits.
Claims are insurance files, and insurance carriers
sometimes open files in circumstances where victims fail to sue, such
as when physicians report errors but patients decide to lump it or
plaintiffs' attorneys decline their cases. Thus, the 86 percent figure
overstates the frequency of non-payment in lawsuits to an unknown
degree. 48 Second, TMA's study says nothing about the merits of claims
that closed without payment. It observes that 86 percent of claim files
closed without payments, not that 86 percent rightly closed without
payments. To show the latter, one would have to review evidence
bearing on the merits of the unpaid claims. TMA made no such
review. It is therefore possible that payments should have been made
on some or all of these unpaid claims. In terms of the typology of
Table 1, these claims may have been false negatives (cell 3), a
possibility supported by a nationwide study of closed insurance

44. Efforts to quantify the frequency of frivolous lawsuits have made the most headway in
the securities field. See James Bohn & Stephen Choi, Fraudin the New-Issues Market: Empirical
Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 903, 935 (1996) (finding that many
securities class actions meet a test of frivolousness). Even here, though, academics disagree.
Charles Yablon argues that many securities class actions thought to be frivolous actually involve
non-frivolous long-shot claims. Charles M. Yablon, A Dangerous Supplement? Longshot Claims
and Private Securities Litigation,94 Nw. U. L. REV. 567, 586-93 (2000).
45. Chris Guthrie, FramingFrivolous Litigation:A Psychological Theory, 67 U. CHI. L. REV.
163, 163 n.2 (2000) (citing sources recognizing dearth of hard evidence showing that frivolous
lawsuits are a serious problem).
46. DAVID RAUMA & THOMAS E. WILLGING, REPORT OF A SURVEY OF UNITED STATES
DISTRICT JUDGES' EXPERIENCES AND VIEWS CONCERNING RULE 11, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL

PROCEDURE, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER 3 (2005) (finding that 85 percent of judges view frivolous
lawsuits as either "no problem," a "very small problem," or a "small problem").
47.

TEXAS MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, MEDICAL LIABILITY STUDY (on file with authors).

48. A study of closed medical malpractice claims in Minnesota found that 36 percent of
incident files were closed without payment because the claim was not pursued. MINNESOTA
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIM STUDY 1982-1987 (1989). Insurers

have some incentive not to open claim files unnecessarily. We do not know how often Texas
liability insurers open files on unpursued claims.
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claims. 49 The high non-payment rate reported in TMA's study may
actually show that Texas's malpractice system is too frugal.
Although the misuse of the TMA study is blatant, health care
does provide fertile ground for non-meritorious complaints. Patients
often experience bad outcomes after receiving appropriate care. The
nature of medicine is that many patients do not recover even when
providers do their utmost to help them. Patients also find it hard to
evaluate the quality of care they receive. When there is a bad
outcome, patients may not be able to readily determine whether bad
luck or bad medicine was the cause.
These considerations create the potential for invalid claims but
do not necessarily require them to occur. Patients who experience bad
outcomes may identify nature as the cause. Patients who believe that
errors occurred may be reluctant to sue because they like their
providers or are intimidated by courts. Patients who wrongly blame
providers for their problems may not find plaintiffs' attorneys who are
willing to represent them. Even when soil is fertile, nothing may
grow. The frequency of frivolous complaints can only be determined
empirically.
One indication of the likely frequency of frivolous lawsuits is
provided by the sorting efforts of plaintiffs' lawyers, who have "a
strong incentive to screen prospective plaintiffs and to accept only
cases having sufficiently high expected value" because they work on
contingency. 50 Many studies show that plaintiffs' attorneys reject
weak cases. Professor Bert Kritzer surveyed plaintiffs' attorneys in
Wisconsin to determine how often they accepted cases. Respondents
reported a total of 53,584 contacts requesting representation, of which
almost 70 percent were declined. 51 The main reasons for declining
cases were weak evidence of liability or small damages. Malpractice
lawyers are even choosier. They reject 80 percent or more of the
requests for representation they receive. Professor Kritzer personally
observed three lawyers, who collectively received fourteen requests for

49. See DANZON, supra note 9, at 43 (studying 6,000 closed insurance claims and
"estimat[ing] that between 39 and 53 percent of the claims dropped without payment-about
one-quarter of all claims in the data base-would have produced an award for the plaintiff if
taken to verdict").
50. Henry S. Farber & Michelle J. White, Medical Malpractice:An Empirical Examination
of the Litigation Process, 22 RAND J. ECON. 199, 200 (1991).
51. HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY FEE LEGAL
PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 69-74 (2004); Herbert M. Kritzer, Seven Dogged Myths

Concerning Contingency Fees, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 739, 754-57 (2002); Herbert M. Kritzer,
Contingency Fee Lawyers As Gatekeepers in the Civil Justice System, 81 JUDICATURE 22, 24
(1997); Herbert M. Kritzer, Holding Back the Floodtide: The Role of Contingent Fee Lawyers,
WIS. LAW., Mar. 1997, at 10, 63.
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representation over a three month period from clients with medical
malpractice claims, and rejected all of them.
Another study evaluated how plaintiffs' attorneys handle the
cases of individuals who called their office complaining about medical
malpractice. 5 2 The lawyers' offices received calls from 730 persons
seeking representation over ten randomly selected days in 1991. Only
one in thirty calls led to a lawsuit, meaning that the lawyers rejected
97 percent of the potential plaintiffs. Cases with modest expected
damages (less than $50,000) or an imminent or expired statute of
limitations were declined routinely. Cases that met these screens
were regularly reviewed by independent physician-experts.5 3 Many
54
requests for representation were rejected when the reviews came in.
Most patients with weak cases or low expected damages give
up looking for lawyers after being rejected a few times. A few are
more persistent. In one extreme case, a Texas woman reported that
92 lawyers refused her request for help in bringing a malpractice suit
against the hospital that treated her 18-year-old son, who died of
pneumonia. 55 She ultimately sued the hospital by herself because no
lawyer would represent her.
The frequency with which plaintiffs' attorneys drop medical
malpractice cases after taking them might be thought to indicate that
these dropped cases were actually frivolous. Empirical studies do not
support the inference that plaintiffs' attorneys file lawsuits they know
are weak. The studies find that "drops" occur when cases thought to
56
be strong initially turn out to be weak once discovery is performed.
The pattern of filing cases that look good and withdrawing them when
doubts arise indicates that the malpractice system itself weeds out
weak cases. This is, of course, the intended result of the pretrial
process.
Finally, negligence determinations are often "close calls," even
for expert physicians who have the benefit of a complete medical
record and the claim file. Given this backdrop, it is unreasonable to

52.

LaRae I. Huycke & Mark M. Huycke, Characteristics of Potential Plaintiffs in

MalpracticeLitigation, 120 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 792, 796 (1994).

53. Id. ("Attorneys obtained medical records for 90 claims, and independent medical experts
reviewed 85."). Some law firms employ nurses as full-time staff members to provide internal
assessments.
54. Id. (noting that independent review of 85 claims resulted in outright rejection of 53
claims (62% of the total)). "Of those claims rejected after being evaluated by medical experts,
most were felt to have had insufficient damages (42%) or lacked negligence on the part of the
health care provider (26%)." Id.
55. Claire Osborn, Many Lawyers Avoiding Malpractice Cases, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN,
June 14, 2004, at Al.
56. Farber & White, supranote 50, at 215-16.
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expect plaintiffs' lawyers to perfectly distinguish strong medical
malpractice cases from weak ones at the outset of a lawsuit.
V. Do INJURED PATIENTS GET WHAT THEY DESERVE?

Part III addressed the accuracy with which the malpractice
system matches payment to negligent error. This Part focuses on the
degree to which payment and severity of injury correspond. Tort
reformers assert that the "lawsuit lottery" allows ignorant jurors to
award staggering sums to sympathetic patients with minor injuries
and persuasive contingent-fee lawyers. 5 7 This is a caricature of
compensation patterns in the tort system, as empirical researchers
have known for years. 58 Professor Michael Saks summarized the
findings of these empirical studies as follows: under-compensation is
the norm in the tort system, although victims with small claims are
sometimes modestly overpaid. 59 Under-compensation also correlates
positively with injury severity, so that victims suffering the worst
injuries recover the smallest portions of their losses. As Saks notes,
"[t]his pattern of overcompensation at the lower end of the range and
under-compensation at the higher end is so well replicated that it
qualifies as one of the major empirical phenomena of tort litigation
60
ready for theoretical attention."
The hallmark of a lottery is that winners invest small and win
big-and are accordingly happy to have played. In the tort system,
however, the biggest "winners"-the claimants who receive the most
money-are the biggest losers as well. They suffer serious injuries or
death, and they do not even recover their losses, especially after legal
fees and expenses are paid. They probably prefer winning in the tort

57. U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,

supra note 22, at 3 ("The results

[produced by the malpractice system] are as arbitrary for patients as they are for providers.
When there are recoveries, they often are based on sympathy, attractiveness of the plaintiff, and
the plaintiffs socio-economic status (educated, attractive patients recover more than others)."
(citation omitted)).
58. See, e.g., JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN AVIATION
ACCIDENT LITIGATION (1988); ELIZABETH M. KING & JAMES P. SMITH, COMPUTING ECONOMIC
LOSS IN CASES OF WRONGFUL DEATH (1988); ELIZABETH M. KING & JAMES P. SMITH, ECONOMIC
LOSS AND COMPENSATION IN AVIATION ACCIDENTS (1988).

59.

Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation

System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1218 (1992).

60. Id. More recently, Professor Saks reaffirmed these observations in an online post,
indicating that "under-compensation, even of special damages, is the rule, and overcompensation (except for the smallest injuries) is the exception." Michael Saks, On Ted Frank's
Series of Unfortunate Errors, Or, The Risks of Making it All up Out of Thin Air, quoted in
Posting of Ted Frank to Point of Law Blog, http://www.pointoflaw.com/archives/001122.php (May
2, 2005, 23:08 EST).
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system to losing in it, but they would have been much better off had
they been able to avoid playing the tort "lottery" at all.
Evidence specific to the malpractice context shows that it too
lacks the "invest small/win big" structure of a lottery. Looking at
cases involving emergency room treatment or prenatal care, economist
Frank Sloan and colleagues compared plaintiffs' economic lossesmainly, their past and future medical costs and their lost wages or
expected income-to the amounts they received. 61 They found that
"claimants tended to be under-compensated, and [that] the fraction of
loss recovered tended to be less for the most severe injuries and for
deaths, in particular for infants."6 2
On average, the plaintiffs
recovered about half their losses.
The "lawsuit lottery" charge (that sympathetic jurors award
enormous sums to patients with minor injuries) actually raises two
questions: how often do patients with minor injuries get to trial, and
how do they fare when they do so? Trials involving patients with
minor injuries appear to be few and far between. Studying a sample
of medical malpractice trials drawn from large counties nationwide,
the Bureau of Justice Statistics ("BJS") found that "90% of medical
malpractice trials involved plaintiffs who claimed malpractice had
63
caused death or permanent injury."
When cases involving less severe injuries are tried, they result
in smaller verdicts. The BJS's study of medical malpractice trials
nationwide found an enormous impact of injury severity on damage
awards: "[M]edian award amounts for medical malpractice trials
arising from death claims ($837,000) and permanent injuries
($412,000) were higher than the median awards for medical
malpractice
trials that
stemmed from temporary
injuries
($77,000)[]."64 Given the lottery metaphor, another finding in the BJS
report is even more interesting: no patient with a temporary injury
received an award exceeding $1 million from a jury. 65 According to the

61. Frank Sloan & Stephen van Wert, Costs of Injuries, in SUING FOR MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE 139, 139 (Frank A. Sloan et al. eds., 1993).
62. Id. at 220.
63. THOMAS H. COHEN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE TRIALS AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES 2001, at 1 (Apr. 2004), available at

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/mmtvlcOl.pdf. The BJS data includes separate variables for
permanence of injury and seriousness of injury. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended
Consequences of Medical Malpractice Damages Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391,

506 (2005)

(constructing severity variables from three BJS variables, including permanence and seriousness
of injury).
64.

COHEN, supra note 63, at 2.

65.

Id.
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BJS study, the set of true lottery winners-patients with small losses
who win big jury awards-is empty.
Similarly, a recent study of California jury verdicts with large
non-economic awards found that significant verdicts favoring
plaintiffs with minor injuries are rare. As the study notes, "[I]n
general, plaintiffs' injuries were severe: Approximately half resulted
in death, grave injury, or major injury. No claims involved emotional
or insignificant injury exclusively, and only 3% involved temporary
minor injury."66 Non-economic damages and the chance of a multimillion dollar verdict correlated strongly with injury severity. 67
It also takes a long time for patients to get compensation from
the legal system. The General Accounting Office found that claims
closed in the mid-1980s took sixteen months from injury to claim and
twenty-five months from claim to disposition. 68 Claims involving more
severe injuries and larger payments took longer than others to resolve,
with claims involving more than $1 million having the longest
disposition times. 69 Medical malpractice cases also appear to take
longer than tort cases of other kinds. Studying a nationwide sample of
tried cases, Professor Michael Heise found a mean length for all civil
cases that reached juries of 30.2 months, while the average tried
70
malpractice case lasted more than half a year longer, 38.4 months.
To summarize, payment and injury are closely correlated-but
injured patients often do not get what they deserve because the
malpractice system is stingy. Adding insult to injury, it takes a long
time for the under-compensation to arrive.

66. David M. Studdert et al., Are Damages Caps Regressive? A Study Of Malpractice Jury
Verdicts In California,23 HEALTH AFF. 54, 57 (2004).
67. Id. at 58, 60 (reporting "a statistically significant jump between the mean[]
[noneconomic awards] for the bottom three [injury severity categories] and [the] top three
severity categories"); see also Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform: Women,
Children, and the Elderly, 53 EMORY L.J. 1263, 1269 (2004) (emphasizing severity of injury in
tried cases).
68.

U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: CHARACTERISTICS OF CLAIMS

CLOSED IN 1984, at 18 (1987).
69. Id.; see also id. at 34 ("[C]laims for which no payment was made had a median
disposition time of 17.0 months, and the claims that received the smallest indemnity payments
($1 to $999) had the lowest median and average disposition times of 6.0 and 11.9 months,"
respectively). The median and average time from claim to disposition of claim with an indemnity
payment of $1 million was 76 months and 64.9 months, respectively. Id.
These delays are not unique to the United States. Fenn and Rickman report similar
disposition times in England. "In the UK, a National Audit Office report (NAO (2001)) estimates
that medical malpractice cases take, on average, five and a half years to settle." PAUL FENN &
NEIL RICKMAN, LEGAL LIABILITY AND THE TIMING OF SETTLEMENT IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 2

(2005), availableat http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1543&context=alea.
70. Michael Heise, Justice Delayed? An Empirical Analysis of Civil Case Disposition Time,
50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 813, 834 (2000).
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VI. How OFTEN DO PLAINTIFFS WIN AT TRIAL?
Provider-defendants win the vast majority of medical
malpractice trials. According to the Insurance Information Institute,
a study of almost 11,000 medical malpractice trials between 1985 and
1999 found that provider-defendants won approximately 81 percent of
the time. 71 The BJS study of medical malpractice cases tried in large
counties across the United States in 2001 found that providerdefendants won approximately 73 percent of the time. 72 The recent
Harvard study of closed insurance claims found a comparable
73
imbalance.
Plaintiffs win trials of other kinds of lawsuits far more often
than they persuade juries in medical malpractice cases. For example,
the BJS study reports that plaintiffs won 52 percent of all tort trials in
its sample that took place in 2001. The remarkably high defense win
rate in medical malpractice cases ranks as one of the most robust
findings of empirical studies of the civil justice system.
When plaintiffs do win at trial, they receive a "trial premium"
relative to the amounts they would have received had they settled.
Studying Florida cases, Sloan et al. found that "those who won at trial
received 22 percent more than economic loss." 74 By comparison,
patients who settled usually recovered much less than their economic
costs. 75 The new study of payment/error matching by Studdert et al.
also reports a trial premium. 76 In an ongoing study of Texas closed
77
claims data, we find a trial premium as well.
To be sure, it is misleading to measure trial premiums in terms
of trial verdicts. The actual premium is not the difference between the
mean or median trial verdict and the mean or median settlement; it is
the difference between the mean or median amount a plaintiff who
wins at trial actually recovers and the mean or median settlement
71. Insurance Information Institute, Hot Topics and Insurance Issues: Medical Malpractice,
http://www.iii.org/media/hottopics/insurance/medicalmal/ (last visited May 31, 2006).
72.

COHEN, supra note 63, at 1.

73. Studdert et al., supra note 25.
74. Sloan, supra note 29, at 195. Ted Frank used this finding to imply that patients who
win at trial recover too much. See Posting of Ted Frank, supra note 37. However, Sloan et al.
expressly denied that the trial premium implies over-compensation. "When one considers that
patients have to pay their attorneys, defray expert fees and other litigation costs, and reimburse
Medicare, Medicaid and other payers from theses sums, even the trial recoveries seem
ungenerous." Sloan, supra note 29, at 195. Sloan et al. also emphasized that any overpayments
won in tried cases fail by far to offset the overall problem of under-compensation caused by
under-claiming. Id.
75. Id.
76. Studdert et al., supranote 25.
77. See Hyman et al., supra note 8.
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payment.
Because post-verdict payments are often substantially
discounted by settlement or remittitur, the actual trial premium is
much smaller than a focus on undiscounted verdicts would make it
appear. Professor Neil Vidmar, who has conducted numerous studies
of jury verdicts in medical malpractice cases, finds that large jury
awards tend to be reduced drastically on appeal, in subsequent
settlement negotiations, or by other means. The larger the award, the
more likely it is to be substantially reduced.7 8 For example, in a
report on Pennsylvania medical malpractice cases that closed between
1999 and 2001, Vidmar found that "[o]f twenty-two cases involving
jury verdicts of $5 million or more, the final payment to the plaintiffs
ranged between 6 percent and 46 percent of the jury verdict, with the
average settlement being 22 percent of the jury award. As in previous
research, the largest awards tended to be reduced the most." 79 In a
study we are currently completing of Texas closed claims, we find that
post-verdict "haircuts" are more common and larger than has been
80
previously observed.
VII. PAYMENT FREQUENCY AND AMOUNT
When premiums for liability insurance spike, health care
providers and tort reformers point the finger at various aspects of the
malpractice litigation system, including overly generous juries and
frivolous lawsuits. In political circles, these explanations are the
conventional wisdom. One can assess the validity of these charges by
examining payment trends for all closed claims. If a significant
increase in jury verdicts occurred, payments (both total and per claim)
should have become larger, triggering a lagging increase in the
number of claims. In the absence of these changes, it is hard to see
how changes in jury verdicts can drive up insurance premiums. If a
rising tide of frivolous lawsuits generated an increasing flow of
extortionate settlements, claims and total payments should have

78.

See Neil J. Vidmar, Felicia Gross & Mary Rose, Jury Awards for Medical Malpractice

and Post-verdictAdjustments of Those Awards, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 265, 280, 298 (1998); see also
NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY: CONFRONTING THE MYTHS
ABOUT JURY INCOMPETENCE, DEEP POCKETS AND OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AWARDS 261 (1995); Neil

J. Vidmar, The American Civil Jury for Auslander (Foreigners),13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 95,
122 (2003).
79. Neil Vidmar, Juries and Jury Verdicts in Medical Malpractice Cases: Implications for
Tort Reform in Pennsylvania (Jan. 28, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Neil Vidmar);
see also Neil Vidmar & Leigh Ann Brown, Tort Reform and the Medical Liability Insurance
Crisis in Mississippi:Diagnosingthe Diseaseand Prescribinga Remedy, 22 MISS. C. L. REV. 9, 30
(2002).

80.

See Hyman et al., supra note 8.
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increased, although payments per claim may well have dropped. In
the absence of these changes, it is hard to see how frivolity can be
responsible for the premium increase. More broadly, tracking total
payments, claims, and payments per claim allows one to test the
global claim that the malpractice system caused liability insurance
premiums to spike. If total payments held steady or changed slowly
and predictably over time in response to known cost drivers, forces
outside the malpractice system must be responsible for the premium
spikes.
It is difficult to perform such longitudinal studies, because the
necessary closed claims data are often not publicly available or do not
However, three longitudinal studies were
cover enough years.
published in 2005-and all three come to broadly similar conclusions.
Black et al. studied malpractice payment trends in Texas
during the period from 1988 to 2002 using a closed claim database
created by the Texas Department of Insurance ("TDI").8 1 The title of
this study-"Stability, Not Crisis"-conveys its core finding: no sudden
changes occurred in the number or size of payments that could
account for the dramatic premium spikes in Texas beginning in late1999. When adjusted for population growth, the number of closed
claims, the number of claims with payouts of $25,000 or more (in
constant 1988 dollars), and the percentage of claims that produced
large payouts were all stable. The number of claims and of large paid
claims grew slower than the supply of Texas physicians, causing
claims and paid claims per 100 physicians to fall. Claim and paid
claim frequency showed no time trend when adjusted for health care
expenditures. Payout per large paid claim rose by 0.1 to 0.5 percent
per year, but the increase was either not statistically significant or
Median
barely significant, depending on the dataset employed.
payouts on large paid claims were flat, controlling only for general
inflation. With the same adjustment, the mean payout grew slightly,
reflecting a gradual decline in the frequency of small paid claims.
Total payouts to patients were also roughly constant over time when
adjusted for inflation and health care consumption.
Using a similar dataset maintained by Florida insurance
regulators, Vidmar et al. examined trends in claim frequency and

81. Black et al., supra note 26, at 209. Starting in 1988, TDI required all malpractice
insurers to file detailed individual reports of claims with payments above $10,000, and to make
aggregate reports of smaller claims annually. Individually reported claims accounted for the bulk
of the dollars paid. Because TDI audited the data for accuracy starting in 1990, the findings for
1990-2002 are likely the most robust.
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payments in that state from 1990 to 2003.82 Their findings differ from
those of Black et al. in some important respects, but they nonetheless
describe a claiming environment that was generally stable. Total
claim frequency held level over 1990 to 1997, averaging about 2,600
claims per year. Paid claims grew in number from 1990 to 2003,
roughly in line with Florida's rising population, but more slowly than
Florida's supply of physicians. Paid claims per 100 doctors fell from
3.98 in 1990 to 3.33 in 2002. Turning to payment amounts, Vidmar et
al. found that mean (median) payments for paid claims increased
substantially, from $177,000 ($49,000) in 1990 to $300,000 ($150,000)
in 2003, in constant 2003 dollars. The number of $1 million payments
also increased, from twenty-nine in 1990 to ninety-seven in 2003, but
the average size of payments over $1 million did not change. In other
words, more patients received $1 million payments, but the average
payment to a patient who received a $1 million payment did not
83
change.
Vidmar et al. attribute the observed increase in payment size
to a significant increase in the severity of the injuries claimants
sustained, and to larger awards within injury severity categories,
possibly driven by the growing cost of health care.8 4 Florida's
experience with malpractice claims thus appears to have been more
dynamic in the 1990s than Texas's system. But if Vidmar et al. are
right, the changes in Florida reflect neither frivolous lawsuits, nor
juries run amok, nor any other defect in the malpractice system.
Rather, Florida, like Texas, witnessed a gradual decline in small
medical malpractice cases.
Payments rose because plaintiffs'
attorneys adjusted their portfolios, taking fewer cases with minor
injuries and more cases with severe injuries or death. The problem
was not a sudden rash of frivolous cases but instead, a host of serious
ones.
Chandra et al. evaluated trends in claims and payments by
drawing on reports of malpractice settlements filed with the National
Practitioner Databank between 1991 and 2003.85
Their sample
contained 184,506 reports concerning physicians in all fifty states. In
general, their findings mirrored those of Black et al. and Vidmar et al.
82. Neil Vidmar et al., Uncovering the "Invisible"Profile of Medical MalpracticeLitigation:
Insights from Florida, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 315, 333-35 (2005). Owing to changes in Florida's
reporting practices, many findings in this study are limited to 1990-1997.
83. Vidmar et al. did not provide information on total payments.
84. Unfortunately, Vidmar et al. did not perform a regression analysis to estimate the
relative importance of these factors.
85. Amitabh Chandra, Shantanu Nundy & Seth A. Seabury, The Growth of Physician
Medical Malpractice Payments: Evidence from the National PractitionerDatabank, 26 HEALTH
AFF. W5-240, 241-47 (2005).
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They found that the frequency of paid claims was stable. The number
of payments per 100,000 persons actually fell slightly, from 5.2 to 5.0.
Like the Florida researchers, they found that payment size increased:
a 52 percent rise in real dollars from 1991 to 2003, yielding an average
increase in severity of 4 percent per year. Curiously, the rate of
growth slowed to 1.6 percent during 2000 to 2003, the years during
which liability premiums spiked nationwide.
Chandra et al. also followed the Florida team in finding
relatively little growth in the size of the largest payments, although
Instead of focusing on
they employed a different methodology.
the top 10 percent
et
al.
isolated
$1
million,
Chandra
payments above
of claims by size. The mean payment for this subgroup rose from
about $868,000 in 1991 to about $1,155,000 in 2003. The average
annual growth rate for the largest claims was 2.5 percent-much
lower than the 4.0 percent rate of increase for all reported payments.
Finally, Chandra et al. calculated physician malpractice liability per
$1,000 in health care expenditures (measured two ways), and showed
that the ratio changed little over time. The stability of the ratio led
them to conclude that "rising medical costs, which contribute to the
size of compensatory awards, may explain a sizable portion of
86
payment growth, consistent with other findings."
These three studies indicate that factors outside the medical
malpractice system were responsible for the premium spikes that
commenced in 1999.87
VIII.INCENTIVE-BASED EXPLANATIONS FOR THE FINDINGS OF
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

The studies summarized in Parts II through VII paint a clear
and fairly comprehensive picture of the medical malpractice system at
work. Patients rarely sue, and those who sit on their rights rarely
receive compensation. Virtually all patients who do sue suffered
adverse outcomes involving serious physical injuries, and most have
plausible or valid claims. Truly frivolous complaints are rare. Far
more common are claims that seem strong initially but that turn out
to lack merit. The malpractice system weeds out these claims fairly
well. Patients with meritorious complaints are more likely to receive
payments and tend to receive larger amounts. Over the past fifteen
86. Id. (citing Seth A. Seabury et al., Forty Years of Civil Jury Verdicts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 1 (2004)).

87. The Bureau of Justice Statistics found that median awards and the percentage of
plaintiffs receiving awards of more than one million dollars were stable in 1992 and 1996, but
rose significantly in 2001. We addressed this point in an earlier article.
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years, the system also appears to be stable in important respects.
Claim frequency, payment frequency, payment amount, and jury
verdicts have all fallen slightly, held roughly constant, or risen
slightly. There are no dramatic changes in any of these measures, and
the trends that have been noted appear to reflect rising health care
costs or the progressive removal of smaller cases from the system.
To be sure, the medical malpractice liability system is far from
perfect. It often withholds compensation from patients with valid
complaints, it under-compensates victims systematically when it does
pay them, and it generates high loading costs which appear to be
rising. Despite the conventional wisdom to the contrary, the medical
malpractice liability system does not seem to favor the interests of
plaintiffs. This fact is demonstrated by the frequency of undercompensation and its magnitude, the exceptional win rates defendants
enjoy at trial, the willingness of plaintiffs to discount jury verdicts
88
when settling, and the dollar amounts these patients often give up.
What accounts for these patterns? In this Part, we offer our
take on the incentives that account for the findings reported in Parts
II through VII, separately examining the behavior of patients,
plaintiffs' lawyers, providers/carriers, and overall system dynamics.
We approach the malpractice system as a collection of iterated
exchange relationships involving sophisticated repeat players seeking
the highest possible returns.8 9 This approach makes sense because
the malpractice system operates mainly through voluntary
transactions (settlements) effected by plaintiffs' attorneys and
insurance carriers, both of whom are repeat players. These exchanges
differ from trades that occur in free consumer markets for two
important reasons. First, in the absence of agreement, participants
can force exchanges at prices set by others (judges and juries), if they
are willing to spend the money needed to go to trial. Second,
participants are locked into sequential bilateral monopolies. These
differences have important implications for participants' preferred
strategies.
In particular, they discourage liability carriers from
throwing good dollars at bad claims, and they encourage plaintiffs'
attorneys to specialize and to develop reputations for choosing good
cases and winning at trial. Both of these strategies help maximize the
probability that payments will be made in true positive cases, and not
in false positive and true negative cases.
88. We are not suggesting that the malpractice system should favor the interests of
negligently injured patients. Instead, the malpractice system should create optimal ex ante
incentives to treat all patients non-negligently.
89. Cf. Danzon, supra note 9, at 49-50 ("[Slimple, self-serving rationalism largely explains
average behavior and outcomes in the disposition of medical malpractice claims.").

20061

IT'S THE INCENTIVES, STUPID

1113

A. Patient Behavior
1. How Do Patients Learn They May Have A Claim?
Patients learn they may have claims in two ways: by
monitoring care quality directly, and by receiving information from
others.
Even unsophisticated patients catch some errors, the
canonical examples being wrong-site surgeries and post-operative
infections caused by forgotten surgical tools. But patients may also
pick up on blood type mismatches, misdelivered and undelivered test
results, and certain obvious medication errors. Patients with chronic
illnesses have numerous opportunities to observe their medical
treatments and obtain better information about what is (and is not) an
error.
Patients also receive information about medical mistakes from
others, including the health care providers who commit them.
Although one frequently hears that fear of litigation prevents
providers from admitting mistakes, studies indicate that first-party
disclosures are reasonably common, although far from universal. 90
Other potential informants include health care providers who
observed the malpractice but did not participate in it, providers who
treated the patient for the resulting injury, or family members and
friends. 91
2. Why Don't Most Patients With Claims Sue?
92
It is clear that most negligently injured patients do not sue.
In most respects, the reasons for passivity are obvious. First, medical
errors are often hard to spot. The popular literature on health care
quality is replete with stories of patients who either never discovered
their harms or never identified medical errors as the cause. 93 Even

90. The evidence on voluntary disclosure practices is summarized in Hyman & Silver, Part
of the Problem or Partof the Solution, supra note 1.
91. Hickson et al., Factors that PromptedFamilies, supra note 18, at 1361 (finding that 33%
of the respondents were "advised or influenced to sue by someone outside the immediate family,"
and that "[iun 23 of these 41 cases [56%], the influential acquaintance was a member of the
medical profession.").
92. Ironically, tort reformers seem not to regard this observation as a point in favor of the
tort system. When injured patients sue, tort reformers decry their litigiousness. When they do
not sue, tort reformers point out that the malpractice system fails to compensate them. "Heads, I
win; tails, you lose," anyone?
93. For example, Internal Bleeding, supra note 20, at 83-87, describes the case of an elderly
woman who died after being given insulin by mistake. The cause of death was a mystery until a
nurse found a vial in the ICU. The vial, which had contained insulin, resembled one used for
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physicians asked to review patients' charts often miss departures from
the standard
of care. Patients who do not "name" and "blame" do not
"claim."94 Since statutes of limitations for malpractice are exceedingly
short (usually two years), patients who do not learn about errors
95
expeditiously can lose their rights.
Second, and mercifully, most medical errors inflict harms that
are small or temporary. For example, the study of Colorado and Utah
hospitalizations calculated that 41 percent of negligent adverse events
resulted in a minor temporary disability, and "insignificant" disability
accounted for another 7 percent of negligent adverse events. The
HMPS found that 46 percent of those negligently injured recovered
completely within one month. Like other tort contexts, medical
malpractice injuries are skewed toward the minor end of the scaleand patients know better than to "sweat the small stuff."
Third, health insurance generally covers most of the treatment
costs associated with negligent injury. 96 This reduces the incentive to
sue, especially in jurisdictions that have abrogated the collateral
source rule. 97 The health insurer also has a subrogation claim against
any recovery, further reducing (and complicating) the incentive to
98
proceed with a lawsuit.
Fourth, the malpractice system is expensive, burdensome, and
slow. To become a plaintiff, a patient may have to terminate an
existing relationship with a health care provider and find a new
source of treatment. A patient may fear being "blacklisted," that is,
being refused treatment by other physicians or providers who steer
clear of patients known to sue. 99 A patient must also be willing to be
heparin, a blood thinner used to keep intravenous lines open. The patient's ICU nurse,
intending to flush the intravenous line with heparin, "had inadvertently injected a fatal dose of
insulin," killing the patient. Id. at 87.
94. See generally William Felstiner, Richard L. Able & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and
Transformation of Disputes:Naming, Blaming, Claiming... , 15 LAw & SOC. REV. 631 (1980-81).
95. Huycke & Huycke, supra note 52 (finding that 13 percent of persons who called law
firms with malpractice complaints did so after the statute of limitations expired).
96. See William G. Johnson et al., The Economic Consequences of Medical Injuries:
Implications for a No-Fault Insurance Plan, 267 JAMA 2487, 2489 (1992) ("Compensation from
existing health insurance, for example, reduces the net cost of medical care from $1805 million to
$240 million."); see also DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES
IN THE UNITED STATES (1991).
97.

BAKER, supra note 2.

98. Id.
99. See, e.g., Christine Wiebe, Business of Medicine Briefing, MEDSCAPE MONEY & MED.,
Apr. 30, 2004, available at http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/474639 (reporting that Texas
doctors began blacklisting malpractice claimants and that doctors are requiring patients to
pledge not to assert claims). Doctors are also refusing to treat medical malpractice attorneys,
their family members, and others whom they blame for high insurance rates. See Don Babwin,
Malpractice Wars: Doctors vs. Lawyers: Some PhysiciansRefuse Non-Emergency Care to Lawyers
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interrogated by several plaintiffs' attorneys (because most requests for
representation in medical malpractice cases are refused), to submit to
a deposition (because insurance companies routinely make plaintiffs
prove their cases, even when their own consultants agree that
malpractice occurred), to wait years for compensation, to go to trial if
the case does not settle, and to pay a lawyer a sizable contingent fee
(usually 33 to 50 percent of the recovery plus expenses).
Fifth, the malpractice system is stingy. Patients usually lose,
and those who obtain payments usually recover less than their
economic losses. Patients may not know these facts, but the plaintiffs'
attorneys on whom they rely make it their business to know what
claims are worth. A contingent fee lawyer who consistently takes bad
cases will not remain in practice long. Thus, the expected value of the
claim-the predicted recovery discounted by the probability of
obtaining it-must be large enough to interest an attorney in the case.
Sixth, when it comes to dealing with defective care, there are
alternatives to the legal system. Patients may change providers,
complain to their providers, or report providers to regulators and
disciplinary authorities.'0 0 These alternatives (exit and voice) are
cheaper than suing, and some are also faster-and they siphon off some
patients who might otherwise sue. 10 1
Given this, the dearth of malpractice lawsuits (relative to the
number of medical injuries) is easily explained. Most of the time,
patients have an insufficient incentive to sue. The rational course for
most patients is some combination of lumping it, switching providers,
and complaining. 102
3. Why Do Some Patients With Claims Sue?
Patients file lawsuits when they have a sufficient incentive to
do so. The incentive to sue depends on the severity of the injury, outof-pocket expenses, and the extent of the patient's irritation with the
They Blame for Soaring Costs of Insurance Coverage, HARTFORD COURANT, June 16, 2004; Jeff
Bell, Provoked by Mounting MalpracticeSuits, One Doctor Refuses Care for Trial Lawyers, BUS.
FIRST OF COLUMBUS, May 21, 2004. USA TODAY reported that Selina Leewright, a nurse, was
fired from her post at a hospital because her husband worked as a lawyer at a firm that did
medical malpractice work. Laura Parker, Medical-Malpractice Battle Gets Personal: Some
Doctors Refuse to Treat Attorneys, USA TODAY, June 14, 2004, at 1A.
100. See Marlynn L. May & Daniel B. Stengel, Who Sues Their Doctors? How Patients
Handle Medical Grievances, 24 LAW & SOC'Y. REV. 105, 108 (1990) (finding that patients with
medical grievances who do not sue change providers (46%), complain (25%), consult a lawyer but
do not sue (9%), or "lump it" (26%)).
101. However, some of those who sue take advantage of these options as well. Id. (finding
that 85% of those who sued switched doctors, and 31% complained).
102. See supranote 5, and accompanying text.
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provider. Injury severity significantly affects the likelihood that a
patient will consult a lawyer, as well as the likelihood that a lawsuit
will result. 10 3 Most of those who file a lawsuit are significantly
injured, 10 4 and the severity skew appears to be increasing over time,
10 5
as tort reform makes cases involving less severe injuries nonviable.
Health insurance reduces out-of-pocket expenses, but not everyone
has health insurance, and it typically does not cover all medical
expenses, let alone lost earnings. Studies indicate that substantial
out-of-pocket expenses are an important factor in whether patients
sue. 10 6 Finally, patient irritation (usually related to failures in
communication after an injury has occurred) is an extremely
important predictor of which patients will sue. 10 7 Stated differently,
although lawyers seek to attract malpractice claimants through a
variety of strategies, they are marketing their services to people who
108
are already unhappy with the outcome of their medical care.
These studies indicate that patients respond to incentives and
information when deciding whether to bring malpractice claims to the
legal system for resolution. Injury severity, which determines the
magnitude of patients' losses and their litigation recoveries, is the
most important driver. Given the cost, delays, and cumbersomeness of
the malpractice system, it is hardly surprising that it is appealing
primarily to patients with severe injuries and large damages.

103. See May & Stengel, supra note 100, at 117.
104. Even injuries classified as minor or temporary on the NAIC's 9-level scale usually look
serious when examined closely. The NAIC scale does not accurately track human assessments of
injury severity. See Allen J. Hart, Roselle L. Wissler, & Michael J. Saks, Multidimensional
Perceptions of Illness and Injury, CURRENT RES. SOC. PSYCHOL., 1997, available at
http://www.uiowa.edu/-grpproc/crisp/crisp.2.4.htm.
105. See Vidmar et al., supra note 82; see also Black et al., supra note 26 (finding gradual
disappearance of small cases over time).
106. Hickson et al., supra note 18, at 1361 (noting that 24 percent of claimants offered
financial need as a reason for filing suit). See generally BARRY WERTH, DAMAGES (1998) (family
which filed lawsuit did so because of overwhelming cost of health care services for their child).
107. Hickson et al., supra note 18, at 1361 (finding that 24 percent of malpractice plaintiffs
complained "that [the] physicians had failed to be completely honest with them about what
happened, allowed them to believe things that were not true, or intentionally misled them," and
another 20 percent sued because they believed "the courtroom was the only forum in which they
could find out what happened from the physicians who provided care").
108. See id. (finding "only a single case in which parents failed to suspect a problem until
approached directly by a previously unknown lawyer").
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B. Lawyer Behavior
1. Why Do Lawyers Screen Cases?
The process of finding a lawyer is the first formal step by which
the malpractice system distinguishes between valid and invalid
claims. Not having an attorney effectively means not having a
malpractice lawsuit-but the attorney must be convinced that the
claim is worth pursuing. Most potential plaintiffs are rejected out of
hand because their claims are too small or too weak. In the words of
the title of a well-known article on the subject, plaintiffs' lawyers help
"hold back the floodtide" by turning down the overwhelming majority
of cases that come to their attention.109
Attorneys are strict
gatekeepers because they are paid on contingency, and medical
malpractice cases are risky and expensive to litigate.
Medical malpractice cases are risky because defendants are
reluctant to settle and win a substantial majority of trials. 110 They are
expensive because experts are costly, and three of the four elements of
the cause of action (breach, causation, and damages) are routinely
contested."' The defense bar is replete with sophisticated repeat
players, and everyone knows that plaintiffs' attorneys only get paid if
they win." 2 Plaintiffs' attorneys can not charge supra-competitive

109. Kritzer, Holding Back the Floodtide,supra note 51.
110. See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Why Civil Cases Go to Trial: Strategic
Bargainingand the Desire for Vindication, DIsP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 1997, at 21, 23 (finding
that defendants engaged in strategic bargaining by making no settlement offers in
approximately 60 percent of medical malpractice trials); see also Samuel R. Gross & Kent D.
Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial,
90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 328-29, 369 (1991) [hereinafter Getting to No].
111. See, e.g., Osborn, supra note 55 (quoting Bill Whitehurst, a prominent practitioner in
Austin, Texas, as stating that "the cost of taking a medical malpractice suit to court can be up to
$450,000").
112. See, e.g., Posting of John Day to Evan Schaeffer's Legal Underground, http://www.
legalunderground.com/2005/08/guestposta-pl.html (Aug. 17, 2005):
Our office turns down hundreds of cases every year, almost every one of them is a sad
story, and many of them are downright tragedies... . Every hour we spend working
on cases that have a ten percent chance of recovery we are taking away hours from
maximizing the value of the 'good' cases. . . . It is hard to learn the lesson that we
cannot help everybody. Unfortunately, we have to give serious consideration to be
more like a good oncologist: you can have concern and empathy for that person with
Stage 4 pancreatic cancer, but there is little you can do to help them. Some things we
just can't fix. .. . So, don't be afraid to take a tough case, but do enough homework
before you accept the case that you know what you will be investing by way of time
and money and can make a reasoned judgment that the juice is worth the squeeze.
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rates because the market for legal services is a first-party payer
113
market and is quite competitive.
Consider the issue from a more concrete perspective. In a
closed claims study published in 1987, the General Accounting Office
("GAO") estimated that 11,073 malpractice claimants who received
payments in 1984 paid $307.4 million in fees, an average of $27,761
per person who received a positive recovery." 4 This works out to an
average fee of $52,209 in 2005 dollars, adjusting for general inflation.
To generate fees of this size, plaintiffs' lawyers must focus their efforts
on cases in which the recoverable damages are large-greatly
exceeding those involved in tort cases of other kinds. To put the point
another way, many tort claims that would gain the attention of
lawyers if they stemmed from automobile accidents are too small for
These claims may be
medical malpractice lawyers to handle.
meritorious in the sense that they would qualify as true positives if
paid, but they wind up as false negatives because the cost of pursuing
them is too high. A liability carrier is likely to have to pay when a
traffic accident causes $10,000 in damage to a car, but a carrier rarely
must pay when a medical error saddles a patient with an equivalent
loss because a plaintiffs attorney cannot credibly threaten to litigate
so small a case. When it comes to losses that most people would
regard as serious-losses ranging up to $50,000-the malpractice
115
system gives health care providers a free pass.
Critics of medical malpractice litigation argue that attorneys
have an incentive to pursue long-shot cases, because they only need to
win a few to make the gamble worthwhile." 6 But to maintain fees at
the indicated levels, plaintiffs' lawyers must also reject weak cases,
because expected fees reflect both the damages incurred and the

113. See Danzon & Lillard, supra note 28, at 363 (finding that caps on contingent fees
increased the rate at which claims were dropped, decreased settlement size, and reduced the
frequency of trials; arguing that these findings "tend to refute the common argument that
contingent fees yield above-competitive, windfall returns" by showing that fees cannot be
reduced without also reducing attorney effort; and concluding that "the evidence is more
consistent with contingent fees yielding only competitive returns at the margin").
114. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE:
CHARACTERISTICS OF CLAIMS CLOSED IN 1984, at 48 (1987).
115. See Huycke & Huycke, supra note 52 (finding that "[simall recoverable damages
(generally less than $50,000 [or $67,000 in 2006 dollars])" was the reason most commonly cited
by attorneys for rejecting requests for representation); see also DANZON, supra note 10, at 42
(studying 6,000 closed malpractice claims and concluding that "[t]he evidence confirms that low
stakes or high costs increase the likelihood that a case will be dropped").
116. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 22 ("Lawyers,
therefore, have an interest in finding the most attractive case. They develop a portfolio of cases
and have an incentive to gamble on a big 'win.' If only one case results in a huge verdict, they
have had a good payday.").
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likelihood of winning. An investment in screening makes a great deal
of sense, because it is better to learn that a case is weak initially,
rather than find out after investing substantial resources and time.
Indeed, this strict screening process makes hash of the assertion that
plaintiffs' attorneys routinely file and pursue frivolous cases. 1 7 A
plaintiffs attorney would have to hoodwink or co-opt all of the
following for a frivolous lawsuit to be cost-effective: the lawyer's
partners (who share the burden of a lawsuit's costs) an independent
expert reviewer (in jurisdictions that require lawyers to obtain
certificates of merit before filing complaints), additional experts
brought in to testify at trial; a defendant's malpractice insurer (which
will typically hire independent experts of its own before paying a
claim)," 8 arbitrators, mediators, or the members of screening panels
in the many states that use them, a judge, and a jury.
Nor can one plausibly contend that the threat of pushing a
frivolous case to conclusion is sufficient to generate an early
settlement offer. First, the threat is not credible, given the obstacles
one must surmount. Second, in the medical malpractice context, early
settlements are rare and occur mainly when plaintiffs have strong
cases, as discussed previously. Third, malpractice policies usually
entitle physicians to object to settlements, and physicians often refuse
to settle weak claims. Fourth, malpractice insurers regularly put
plaintiffs to their proof, even when their own internal reviews indicate
that malpractice occurred. 119 Fifth, insurers simply do not make offers
when their experts think providers performed well. 20 Sixth, how
117. Even law professors who study frivolous lawsuits acknowledge that no academic
researcher has ever turned up hard evidence that there are enough of them to worry about. See,
e.g., Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519, 596 (1997). For a clear
and brief discussion of existing economic accounts of frivolous lawsuits, see Peter H. Huang,
Lawsuit Abandonment Options in Possibly Frivolous Litigation Games, 23 REV. LITIG. 47, 59-62
(2004) (modeling "possibly frivolous" litigation in terms of option rights, and concluding that a
plaintiff can credibly threaten to commence litigation and to continue it as long as the option
value of a claim exceeds the expected cost of remaining litigation stages (the premium the
plaintiff must pay for the right to hold onto the option)).
118. Peeples et al., supra note 29, at 884 (finding that "outside reviews obtained by the
insurer play a critically important role in the claims resolution process," and that "the insurer
will solicit more reviewers in a case where standard of care is eventually determined to have
been breached").
119. Id. at 886 ("Even in cases where the insurer concluded the standard of care was
breached, the insurer routinely required proof and corroboration. In cases in which the insurer
made an offer, the plaintiff was always deposed . . . , and an expert for the plaintiff was almost
always identified ...and almost always deposed.").
120. Id. at 887:
The insurer consistently made an offer when it concluded that the standard of care
was breached, and only once made an offer when it had concluded that the standard of
care had not been breached. When the insurer was uncertain regarding breach, an
offer was made in only six of seventeen cases.
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plausible is it that liability insurers, who review hundreds or
thousands of claims each year, are unable to tell strong claims from
weak claims? To get a settlement payment, a plaintiffs' attorney has
to bring a meritorious case.
Given the high cost of medical malpractice litigation, plaintiffs'
attorneys' preference for cases with clear liability and large damages
is understandable. 1 21 Only these cases are likely to generate fees
sufficient to cover upfront costs and provide an adequate return on
invested time and effort. Indeed, as long as there is a pool of strong
cases not being brought, as the empirical literature shows is the case,
these incentives are magnified. A lawyer would have to be woefully
incompetent to "double-down" on what discovery reveals is a weak
case, instead of dumping it and finding a strong case to pursue.
2. Why do Lawyers Drop Cases After Accepting Them?
Despite their best efforts, plaintiffs' attorneys still bring a large
number of weak cases. These cases are routinely dropped as soon as it
becomes clear that they are weak. This dynamic is a matter of
experience and math. Several studies find that experienced trial
lawyers choose cases more wisely than novice attorneys, as measured
by drop rates, frequency of payout, and frequency of insurer
22
agreement that malpractice occurred. 1
Math matters because attorneys see far more weak claims than
strong claims. Even if they assess the merits of each claim with great
accuracy, plaintiffs' attorneys will still initiate many weak cases. A
simple mathematical calculation demonstrates the problem.
As
detailed previously, approximately 1 percent of hospitalized patients
are negligently injured. Assume that 10 percent of these negligently
injured patients consult an attorney, and that a case will be brought
in every instance where the attorney believes there has been negligent
treatment. An additional 3 percent will suffer an adverse event which
is not the result of negligence, and some additional number (assume 7
percent) will be dissatisfied with their care for one reason or another.
As before, assume that 10 percent of these non-negligently injured
patients consult an attorney, and that a case will be brought in every
121. See Vidmar & Brown, supra note 79, at 32 ("In Vidmar's research on medical
malpractice, most plaintiff lawyers that were interviewed indicated that they could not consider
taking a medical malpractice case unless the potential damages exceeded $100,000 and unless
they estimate that the chances of proving negligence are substantial.").
122. Peeples et al., supra note 29, at 885; Catherine T. Harris et al., Who Are These Guys? An
Empirical Examination of Medical MalpracticePlaintiffs'Attorneys, 58 S.M.U. L. REV. 225, 24547 (2005). See also Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Plaintiffs Lawyers, Specialization,and
Medical Malpractice, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1051 (2006).
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instance where the attorney believes there has been negligent
treatment. Finally, assume the attorney is 90 percent accurate in
identifying strong cases and weak cases. In a population of ten
thousand hospitalized patients, one hundred will be negligently
injured, ten will consult an attorney, and nine strong cases will be
brought.
In like fashion, there will be a thousand dissatisfied
patients, of whom one hundred will consult a lawyer, resulting in ten
weak cases. The combination of a large non-negligently injured
population and a small error rate in distinguishing cases means that
53 percent (ten out of nineteen) of che lawsuits that are brought will
lack merit. The percentage of weak cases will be even larger if the
number of negligently injured patients is smaller or if the attorney's
screening processes are more error-prone.
The foregoing example is artificial because it assumes the line
between strong claims and weak claims is clear. In reality, the divide
is murky.
As explained previously, medical experts frequently
disagree when making quality of care assessments.
Plaintiffs'
attorneys cannot succeed where experts fail. Their portfolios will
always contain some cases that some people will regard as bad. The
project of sorting the wheat from the chaff is inherently difficult,
especially at the outset of litigation when many facts are unknown.
Finally, claims may be dropped, not because there is no
negligence, but because damages turn out to be insufficient. As noted
previously, the inability of injured patients with meritorious claims
but small damages to obtain compensation is a signal feature of our
malpractice system. These cases become "false negatives" because
they are incapable of generating fees sufficient to warrant their costs.
Simply stated, a rational plaintiffs' attorney will drop weak cases
(whether the weakness lies in damages, liability, or both) as soon as
their deficiencies become clear.
3. Why Do Lawyers Invest in Reputations?
Plaintiffs' lawyers invest in reputations because they use them
to signal their value to clients, other lawyers, and insurers. As noted
previously, in the world of malpractice litigation, clients seek out
lawyers, not the other way around. The most successful plaintiffs'
lawyers rely on their reputations, and marketing of the same, to
attract clients, rather than hanging around hospital wards and
emergency rooms. 123 A robust referral market helps channel cases to
123. Indeed, disciplinary proceedings have been brought against lawyers who troll for clients
in hospitals-and that hardly seems like the pathway to career success. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v.
Barrett, 897 So. 2d 1269 (Fla. 2005) (disbarring an attorney who paid an employee to solicit
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lawyers who can maximize the value of the claims, while rewarding
those who identify the claims as meritorious in the first instance. The
better the lawyer's reputation, the stronger the signal to the insurer
that the claim is valid. 124
C. Provider/Carrier
Behavior
1. Why Don't Providers Just Pay Up?
Providers, insurers, and tort reformers often criticize the
malpractice system for delivering compensation to only a minority of
patients who deserve it, and for taking too long to process valid claims.
This argument strikes us as an example of the "chutzpah defense,"
best exemplified by the individual who killed his parents, and then
threw himself on the mercy of the court because he was an orphan.25
Nothing prevents providers or liability carriers from offering
payments before patients sue or from paying valid claims
expeditiously. Yet, they rarely compensate patients until threatened
with litigation. A few hospitals and insurers have implemented a proactive approach on which they reach out to patients as soon as
possible, and its widespread use would surely enable the malpractice
system to operate more accurately, more quickly, and with smaller
transaction costs. 126 Yet, by and large, compensation flows only to
patients who sue and only after litigation becomes protracted. On
economic grounds, this is easy to explain. Given the high degree of
under-claiming and the high drop rates for malpractice cases, the
strategy of paying claims only after protracted litigation minimizes
27
expected liability costs.1
clients in hospitals and a chiropractor office); In re Blaylock, 978 P.2d 381 (1999) (dismissing a
complaint against the defendant, who was both an attorney and emergency room physician, for
soliciting clients during his hospital shifts).
124. See Harris et al., supra note 122, at 246 (finding that insurers take account of attorneys'
reputations when responding to claims); Martin & Daniels, supra note 122, at ** (same).
125 See Alex Kozinski & Eugene Volokh, Lawsuit Shmawsuit, 103 YALE L.J. 463, 467 (1993). See
also Yates v. City of New York, 2006 WIL 2239430 (D. N.Y. 2006) ('"The word chutzpah... is now
vastly overused in the legal literature. Yet, in a case such as this-in which an individual, after
being mauled by the 450-pound Siberian tiger he had been raising inside his fifth-floor
apartment along with an alligator, sues the city and the police who entered the apartment in an
effort to rescue the animals for doing so without a search warrant- it is a most appropriate term
to use.")

126. See Hyman & Silver, Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution, supra note 1, at 94546.
127. See BAKER, supra note 2:

Because so few people file claims under the present approach-about five percent of
those eligible-a new approach that compensated only one quarter of the people who
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A similar dynamic appears to operate with regard to medical
malpractice cases that go to trial. A government report argues that
lawyers paid on contingency "have incentives to pursue selected cases
to the end in the hope of winning the lottery, even when their client
would be satisfied by a settlement that would make them whole
economically." 128 The unstated assumption is that in the cases that
are tried, insurance companies routinely offer malpractice victims
settlements that fully cover their economic losses. This assumption is
untrue. Professors Gross and Syverud found that in most medical
malpractice cases where trials occurred, defendants (or their insurers)
129
made no settlement offers at all.

Providers, tort reformers, and insurers claim to be concerned
about under-compensation of injured patients and litigation delays.
They could mitigate these problems tomorrow, by abandoning the
chutzpah defense, paying claims without forcing patients to sue and
immediately offering full economic damages to patient-litigants with
strong cases. Their choices (forcing patients to sue and aggressively
fighting even meritorious claims) reveals that their true preference,
consistent with their economic self-interest, is to force injured patients
to bear the largest possible fraction of the cost of negligent treatment.

were eligible would be more expensive than the present approach, even if the
compensation paid per claim were reduced to one quarter of what it is now. And the
insurance premiums required to support a new approach that compensated even half
of those eligible would dwarf the premiums of the present one under almost any set of
reasonable assumptions.
128. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 22.

129. Gross & Syverud, Getting to No, supra note 110, at 342; see also Deborah Jones Merritt
& Kathryn Ann Barry, Is the Tort System in Crisis? New Empirical Evidence, 60 OHIO ST. L.J.
315, 372 (1999) ("In twenty-three of the forty-three cases for which we had information about the
defendant's best offer . . . , the settlement offer was zero . . . . Even among cases that plaintiffs

won, defendants offered no settlement in about half (47.4%) of the cases for which we knew
defendant's final offer.").
One might have thought that a practice of making zero-offers would be risky in a world
where claims for bad-faith refusal to settle can be brought in the event of an above-limits
judgment. Yet, a study of closed Texas malpractice claims finds that payments above the
primary limits are uncommon. See Charles Silver et al., Physicians' Insuring Practices and
Payments on Medical Malpractice Claims (Mar. 2006) (unpublished draft, on file with authors)
(finding that only 1.5% of paid malpractice claims involved payments exceeding the primary
policy limits). We find similar results in another paper focusing on jury verdicts. See Hyman et
al., supra note 8. Evidently, the risk of having to pay more than the policy limits is too small to
discourage insurers from using the zero-offer strategy.
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D. System Behavior
1. Why Do Medical Malpractice Cases Take So Long?
Studies of the civil justice system consistently find that larger,
more complex, and more important cases take longer to resolve and
consume more resources. 130 The larger the amount at stake, the more
complex the issues and the less clear the facts, the more each side is
justified in investing in discovery and pretrial maneuvering.
Discovery allows the parties to share existing information and to
acquire new information bearing on claim value. By eliminating
uncertainty, discovery helps the parties resolve claims where there
was initially disagreement.
Discovery is not free, however, and
parties use it in proportion to its cost and likely economic value. This
means investing greater resources in cases involving more serious
injuries and larger potential damages. Cases with both severe injuries
and difficult liability issues should therefore take longer and require
more litigation investments than cases in which only one or neither of
these features apply.
This simple model is confirmed by a study of medical
malpractice cases involving a group of hospitals in the United
Kingdom with claim disposition times similar to those observed in the
United States. 13 1 The study found that "for many claims there is
considerable uncertainty initially due to lack of information, and this
is gradually resolved over time as more information becomes available
about the circumstances of the event and the standard of care adopted
by the hospital." 132 The study modeled the impact of claim managers'
assessments of liability and damages on the duration and ultimate
disposition of claims, and found that strong claims (those where claim
managers thought plaintiffs were likely to prevail) settled sooner than
others and, in the absence of settlement, were less likely to be
abandoned. Changes in managers' assessments of liability and
130. See Charles Silver, Does Civil Justice Cost Too Much?, 80 TEX. L. REv. 2073, 2096
(2002) (summarizing studies and concluding that "[p]arties investigate more thoroughly and
otherwise spend more time when claims are large and complicated than when they are small and
straightforward").
131. Fenn & Rickman, supra note 69, at 14 ("The mean delay for all claims from incident to
initiation was just under three years, with a further delay of around the same duration from the
claim's initiation to its closure."). See also NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE, HANDLING CLINICAL

NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS IN ENGLAND (2001) (estimating that medical malpractice cases take an
average of five and a half years to settle) (cited in Fenn & Rickman, supra note 69).
132. For example, of the 909 claims that were initially evaluated as involving unclear
liability, only 386 retained that ranking in the managers' final assessments. A good deal of
shifting also occurred in initial assessments of other types, e.g., from "probably liable" to "liable."
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damages had a predictable impact, as "new information weakening
the hospital's case ...spedo up the settlement process" and reduced
133
the likelihood of abandonment.
The authors noted that their results indicate "that both the
settlement and abandonment hazards for a given malpractice claim
can oscillate significantly over the course of the litigation process," as
new information about the case is discovered. 134
From this
perspective, the time spent on discovery generates information
clarifying the strength and value of the case, paving the way for
settlement.
Stated differently, at least some of the "delay" is
productive.
2. Why Do Plaintiffs Receive Trial Premiums?
For plaintiffs, trials are riskier propositions than settlements.
Accordingly, plaintiffs who win at trial should do better on average
than plaintiffs with similar claims who settle their cases. Expressed
in financial instrument terms, the plaintiff owns an option that
entitles him to a trial, whose outcome is uncertain. 135 He can sell the
option to the defendant (by settling) or exercise it. If he exercises the
option, he bears the associated risk and must be compensated for
doing so - otherwise he would just settle and avoid the risks. Thus, it
is not surprising that plaintiffs who win at trial receive larger
payments than plaintiffs with similar claims who settle. At the same
time, as we noted previously, jury verdicts considerably overstate the
size of the trial premium. A more accurate calculation of the actual
premium requires one to standardize the results across cases and
compare actual post-verdict payments with the amounts received in
settlement.
3. Why Do Malpractice Defendants Win at Trial So Often?
In a famous article, Professors Priest and Klein predicted that
1 36
at trial plaintiffs and defendants will each win half of the time.
133. Fenn & Rickman, supra note 69, at 23.
134. Id. at 26.
135. One can also use lottery terminology, although the analogy is inapt for reasons we
explained previously. The plaintiff has a lottery ticket, whose value can be determined in the
drawing (in which case it is either a big winner or a complete loser) or he can sell it in advance of
the drawing to the lottery operator. If the ticket is not drawn, the litigating plaintiff does worse
than the one who settles. If the ticket is drawn, the litigating plaintiff does better than the one
who settles.
136. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 6-30 (1984); see also George L. Priest, Reexamining the Selection Hypothesis, 14 J.
LEGAL STUD. 215 (1985).
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This prediction rests on the assumption that parties settle easy cases
and try cases that fall close to the line. Easy cases settle because the
parties are likely to agree how trials would turn out. Close cases are
tried because the parties' estimates of trial outcomes are likely to
diverge. The 50 percent hypothesis follows because, if plaintiffs and
defendants predict outcomes equally well, they should turn out to be
right equally often, just as two people attempting to guess the outcome
of a large number of coin tosses should both win half the time if one
always says "heads" and the other always says "tails."
The Priest/Klein hypothesis fares poorly in studies of medical
malpractice trials, which consistently find that plaintiffs lose more
than 70 percent of the time.' 37 It holds up better in other tort
contexts, where plaintiff and defendant win rates are more balanced.
Academic researchers have tried to identify the features of medical
malpractice lawsuits that might account for this discrepancy. This is
harder than one might think. Most of the obvious explanations should
change plaintiffs' and defendants' expectations symmetrically,
changing claim values but not causing tried cases to deviate from
those with 50-50 odds. 138 To explain low plaintiff win rates in medical
malpractice trials, considerations that make medical malpractice
tribunals more or less pro-defendant generally will not suffice, as long
as both sides know about them.
What is needed is an explanation for why trials often occur in
cases with low likelihoods of success, even though plaintiffs and
defendants agree on the litigation odds. Professional malpractice
insurance, which sometimes requires consent of the insured to settle a
case, is one possible explanation. 139 Suppose a plaintiff has a 25 to 35
percent chance of winning a case with large damages. Normally, an
insurer would attempt to settle a long-shot case like this one by

137. Studying a nationwide sample of trials in large counties, the Bureau of Justice
Statistics found that plaintiffs won 27% of medical malpractice trials, while tort plaintiffs in
general won 52% of trials. See COHEN, supra note 63. The AMA contends that medical
malpractice plaintiffs win at trial only 17.6% of the time. See American Medical Association,
supra note 22 (stating that "of the 7% of claims that went to jury verdict, the defendant won
82.4% of the time") (citing Exhibits 1 and 6A of PHYSICIAN INSURERS ASS'N OF AM., PIAA CLAIM
TREND ANALYSIS: 2003 (2004)). Unfortunately, the data on which the AMA relies is not available
to researchers.
138. Suppose that juries are biased in favor of patients with severe injuries, as providers and
tort reformers contend, or that they instead favor health care providers, as studies comparing
jurors' assessments to experts' suggest. If plaintiffs and defendants know that juries lean to one
side, they should alter their settlement postures by assigning claims higher or lower values than
they would if juries were neutral. Settlements should still occur in cases where opposing parties
agree, and trials should still split 50-50 because tried cases would still be those falling close to
the line.
139. Gross & Syverud, Getting to No, supra note 110, at 361.
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offering a payment discounted in light of the litigation odds. A
consent-to-settle clause prevents an insurer from doing so without a
doctor's permission, and a doctor might object to avoid the
reputational, reporting, and insurance consequences that accompany a
malpractice settlement. 140 If no settlement offer is forthcoming, a
plaintiff and his or her attorney will face a stark choice: drop a case
with a non-trivial likelihood of success, or try the case knowing that
the odds favor the defendant. Predictably, the decision to try will be
made when the expected damage award exceeds the marginal cost of
going to trial. Also predictably, plaintiffs will lose most long-shot
cases, but will do well when they win. Thus, both high plaintiff loss
rates and high verdicts in a few long-shot medical malpractice cases
can be explained.
The account just offered also explains why juries sometimes
find malpractice in cases where providers honestly believe patients
received proper care and can offer convincing evidence for this
assessment. Long-shot cases are ones in which the evidence weighs in
favor of the defendant, but is not conclusive. If enough of these cases
are tried, the malpractice system will eventually produce a body of
verdicts favoring plaintiffs in cases defendants think they should have
won. Some frequency of jury verdicts in favor of plaintiffs with longshot claims is predictable in a world where providers play "settlement
hardball."
4. Why are Claim Frequencies and Payments Stable?
The academic studies covered in Part VII show that variations
in the frequency and size of payments on medical malpractice claims
stem mainly from inflation, injury severity, and other factors
operating outside of the liability system. Some non-academic studies,
such as an analysis performed by the Missouri Department of
14 1
Insurance, reach the same conclusion.
140. Blocking settlements is relatively costless for providers without large deductibles or
self-insured retentions because carriers pick up the cost of judgments within the policy limits.
Ongoing research by the authors finds that in only a tiny fraction of the cases (less than one
percent) do insured providers contribute personal assets to judgments or settlements. See Silver,
supra note 129.
141. See MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE REPORT
(Oct. 2005), available at http://www.insurance.mo.gov/reports/medmal/2004_MedMalRpt.pdf.
Previous MDI analysis has shown that average awards are highly sensitive to medical
inflation, the growth in real wages, and average injury severity.... Together, medical
care and lost wages are the primary economic components of malpractice awards.
These two factors have exerted a significant upward pressure on average awards in
recent years.
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It remains to explain why medical malpractice claim
frequencies and payments have changed slowly and in response to
identifiable factors. Bovbjerg et al. signaled the answer in 1997,
writing that "[i]n the long run, without significant legislative or
administrative change, one expects a program to reach a steady state
of filings per year that is related to the underlying phenomena that
generate injuries." 142 Here, the "underlying phenomena" are medical
interventions, each of which has an associated probability of harming
a patient. Other things being equal, one expects the number of
injuries and their severity to reflect the volume and nature of the
health care services patients consume.
When consumption or
population rises, injury frequency should rise as well.
When
consumption shifts toward services like surgery or anesthesia that can
inflict serious harms, average injury severity should increase.
Changes in claim frequency and size may not bear a linear
relationship to consumption because the quality of health care may
change (for better or for worse) with the quantity delivered, but there
should be an observable relationship between health care outputs and
outputs flowing from the malpractice system.
Other things are not equal, of course. Inflation-especially
health care cost inflation-steadily causes malpractice payments to
grow in size. Malpractice victims tend to incur substantial past and
future health care costs. Risings wages also matter, because a
significant purpose of compensatory relief is to replace lost income.
Technological change is a huge cost driver too. First, it raises
expectations about the quality of care patients should receive by
increasing the potential for valuable interventions. 143 Second, it
142. Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Administrative Performance of 'No-Fault' Compensation for
Medical Injury, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71, 87 (1997).

143. See William M. Sage, Medical Malpractice in Crisis: Health Care Policy Options,
COUNCIL ON HEALTH CARE ECON. AND POL., Mar. 3, 2003, availableat http://www.kaisernetwork.

org/health cast/uploadedfiles/030303_chcepwelcome.pdf.
In fact the easiest way to look at it is that malpractice shows medicine to be a victim
of its own success. It's what medicine can accomplish and how much that costs that
drives liability costs. This goes back to the first malpractice crisis in America in the
1870's. It was a crisis of suits involving failure of limb fractures to heal after they
were set. Why these suits in 1870? Well because twenty years previously in 1850 long
bone limb fractures were amputated. Amputation does not give route to malpractice
claims. Medical progress does. Most of the increase in recent claims have to do with
things like failure to diagnose, failure to diagnose a disease claim matters because we
can actually do a thing now that we couldn't do previously and you see a host of claims
related to missed or delayed diagnosis of cancer that really captures this phenomenon.
Moreover even though medical progress has allowed us to rescue patients at advanced
stages of disease you'll see claims now that alleged malpractice because the side
effects of treating the disease at the advanced stage are greater than the side effects
of treating the disease if it had been diagnosed in a timely fashion. . . Now many of
those patients survive and can be treated and that changes the damage calculation
and the litigation.
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enables providers to save and to extend the lives of injured patients
who years ago would have died or lived only a short while. Third, it
increases the range of goods and services patients can receive to offset
or adapt to their injuries. Somewhat perversely, the cost of dealing
with malpractice grows as the lives of patients post-malpractice are
improved.
For present purposes, the important point is that the factors
mentioned in this Part operate on the malpractice system from the
outside. Even if nothing inside the system changes-that is, even if
patients claim at the same rate, plaintiffs' attorneys accept requests
for representation at the same rate, and juries evaluate claims
consistently-the system's outputs will nonetheless vary in response
to external forces. Unless these external causes of variation are
controlled for, it will appear that the malpractice system's outputs are
changing-even though they are actually stable.
The conclusion that the malpractice system is generally stable
and predictable seems surprising only because health care providers
and tort reform advocates complain so loudly and so often that it is
"broken" and "spinning out of control." The system is a sizable market
in which thousands of participants make millions of decisions in light
of known incentives that reflect established substantive and
procedural rules. Given its structure and highly diversified nature,
the system's overall performance should not vary much in response to
isolated perturbations, such as outlier jury verdicts and occasional
payments of meritless claims. Shocks like these come out in the wash,
much as the unexpected failure or success of an individual company
has little impact on the overall performance of a diversified portfolio of
stocks.
IX. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?
People usually avoid activities that cost them money and
engage in activities that make them money. One can understand
much about the successes and failures of the American legal system
(and the U.S. health care system) by keeping this simple insight in
mind. Medical malpractice lawsuits are clumsy, expensive, and hard
for plaintiffs to win.
Consequently, patients rarely sue and
malpractice lawyers choose their clients with care. Jurors have high
regard for doctors and hospitals, and are suspicious of patients who
demand large sums of money. Consequently, plaintiffs lawyers prefer
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strong cases that they think they can win-and when they mistakenly
accept a weak case, they drop it as soon as its weakness becomes clear.
The main problem with the legal system is that it exerts too
little pressure on health care providers to improve the quality of
services they deliver. Given the incentives that patients, plaintiffs
lawyers, and health care providers face, this too is predictable. Safe
health care is expensive, and the tort system forces providers to pay
only pennies on the dollar for the injuries they inflict. Rather than
spend money improving their systems, providers find it cheaper to
tolerate the status quo.
So what should we do about these problems? Our answer is
found in the title to this Article: "it's the incentives, stupid." More
concretely, using incentives to align the interests of patients and
providers is much more likely to improve the status quo than anything
currently on the policy agenda.
In particular, we propose the
14 4
following steps, most of which we outlined in a previous article.
A. Make the Health Care Market Work Better
When markets work well, civil justice systems can safely play a
subordinate role in quality improvement. Their main purpose can be
to ensure a degree of civility and respect in economic relationships by
taking the roughest edges off disagreements that buyers and sellers
cannot work out on their own. Put another way, civil justice systems
can supplement consumer-generated pressures to improve but cannot
readily replace those incentives.
In the health care sector, law has historically had to shoulder
too great a burden because market forces have been too weak. Where
else can the government boast of serving customers better than the
private sector does? Yet in health care, VA hospitals lead the private
sector in deploying electronic medical records and in assuring that
patients receive recommended treatments.
Because health care
quality problems abound, courts are asked to exert greater pressure
for quality than they normally do. Even in theory, courts cannot play
so large a role. Markets cause quality to improve automatically, by
encouraging producers to generate new knowledge and to change their
processes as their knowledge grows. Courts decide malpractice cases
on the basis of old knowledge (that may or may not be reliable) that
has been incorporated into a standard of care (that may or may not be
efficient). Courts are therefore inherently limited in what they can do.

144. Hyman & Silver, Partof the Problem or Part of the Solution, supra note 1, at 983-90.
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The first prescription for improving health care quality must
therefore be to increase the strength of market forces. The highest
priority should be given to arrangements that enhance providers'
incentives by tying their compensation to measurable improvements
in outcomes and that enable patients to effectively distinguish
between superior and inferior providers. To restore the ex post tort
system to its proper and limited role, we should place more emphasis
on ex ante contracts between payers, patients, and providers. A good
dose of first-party payment arrangements couldn't hurt either.
B. Allow Premiumsfor MalpracticeInsurance to Rise
Providers are rational. When injuring patients becomes more
expensive than not injuring them, providers will stop injuring
patients. Stated more delicately, when insurance rates go up, they
create a highly salient incentive for providers to improve the quality of
Lowering malpractice premiums
the services they are offering.
through tort reform eliminates this incentive without putting
anything in its place. Litigation rates and premiums will fall on their
own when providers improve the quality of care-thus decreasing the
145
pool of potential plaintiffs.
C. Use Caps Strategically
To date, approximately thirty states have enacted caps on
damages. These caps apply whether providers have made great effort
or no effort to improve the quality of services they provide. How dumb
is that?146 A better strategy, if caps are politically inevitable, is to use
them to encourage providers to improve the quality of care they
provide. One obvious approach is to reward providers for error
reporting and punish them for hiding mistakes. For example, when a
provider reports an error within a specified time of its occurrence, she
would receive the protection of a limit on non-economic damages.

145. Providers occasionally admit this. See, e.g., Joel B. Finkelstein, Senate Passes Patient
Safety Bill with New Error Reporting System, AM. MED. NEWS, Aug. 9, 2004 (on file with
authors) (attributing to Dr. Donald J. Palmisano, the immediate past president of the American
Medical Association, the view that "fewer errors ... will reduce the number of lawsuits against
physicians").
146. This is a separate issue than the wisdom or stupidity of caps as such. On economic
grounds, one would expect liability caps to reduce both the number of large paid claims and the
average payout per claim. In the long run, this should lead to lower insurance premiums. The
effect of caps in the short run is less determinate, because anchoring effects may predominate. To
be sure, matters other than the cost of insurance bear on the desirability of caps as well,
including their distributional consequences.
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When a provider fails to report an error in a timely manner, we
propose that non-economic damages be enhanced. One could use a
similar strategy to reward providers who improve their performance
on certain defined quality benchmarks, by allowing them to take
advantage of a second (and lower) cap on non-economic damages.
Otherwise, there is an incentive to simply file away any error reports,
instead of using them to improve quality. We note that the HEALTH
Act, recently passed by Congress and signed by President Bush,
provides neither an incentive to report errors nor an economic reason
to use error reports to improve quality.
D. Fix Under-claimingand Over-claiming
It is difficult for the tort system to send the appropriate signals
when it is beset with both under-claiming and over-claiming. 147
Under-claiming is hard to fix because most of us cannot easily tell
whether we received proper care. Many negligent injuries are too
small to justify the high cost of malpractice litigation-particularly
when first-party health care payers bear some of the costs. The
prospects for increasing the claim rate are dim, unless we rely on
persons other than patients to activate the legal system and to
generate economic pressure on providers to improve their
performance. Health care workers are the obvious candidates. They
are more likely than patients to know about errors and faulty delivery
systems.
They may also know when health care providers are
ignoring shortcomings instead of correcting them.
A qui tam
approach, loosely based on that found in the False Claims Act, could
create substantial incentives for employees to break the conspiracy of
silence and come forward. The approach we envision would reward
workers for reporting problems to administrative agencies or third
party quality monitors by paying them liquidated bonuses. The
reports would remain confidential to ameliorate employees' fear of
reprisal.
The over-claiming problem is difficult to fix as well, but one
promising avenue is to recognize evidence-based medicine as an
absolute defense to liability. To the extent physicians render care that
147. See Randall R. Bovbjerg, Medical Malpracticeon Trial: Quality of Care is the Important
Standard, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 321, 322 (1986) ("Because today's system handles so few
of the valid claims that could be brought, medical quality would probably be better served in the
long run by increasing rather than reducing the number of liability claims."); William B.
Schwartz & Neil K. Komesar, Doctors, Damages and Deterrence:An Economic View of Medical
Malpractice, 298 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1282, 1284 (1978) ("The ideal negligence signal is achieved
only when every noteworthy incident of malpractice leads to a claim and every valid claim to a
full award.").
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meets consensus standards of quality, there is no reason to subject
them to liability or to devote legal resources to such cases. Although
there are obvious difficulties associated with the development of
consensus standards, physicians who adhere to those standards
should be immune from suit. 148 Of course, physicians could also help
with the over-claiming problem, by being more forthcoming with
patients.
E. Require Repeat Defendants to Undergo Quality Audits and
Publicize the Results
A relatively small fraction of all physicians appear to account
for a disproportionate share of malpractice claims, settlements, and
judgments. Targeting reform efforts against those who are most
responsible for the problem is an efficient use of limited resources.
State licensing boards and the hospitals at which repeat defendants
have privileges should be required to conduct prospective quality
audits, publicize the results of those audits, and report them to the
National Practitioner Databank. 149 Even if the audits do not result in
any disciplinary action or limitation of privileges, the act of publicizing
the quality audits should alone create considerable incentives for
repeat defendant physicians to correct their deficiencies or find
another line of work.

148. This would eliminate such cases as the one recently highlighted in JAMA, where
compliance with evidence-based medicine was put on trial. See generally Daniel Merenstein,
Winners and Losers, 291 JAMA 15 (2004). This approach could also be used to deal more broadly
with claims that are effectively unsupported by empirical evidence, such as cerebral palsy cases
that are alleged to result from intrapartum or peripartum asphyxia. See AMERICAN COLLEGE OF
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY
AND AMERICAN ACADEMY
OF PEDIATRICS,
NEONATAL
ENCEPHALOPATHY AND CEREBRAL PALSY: DEFINING THE PATHOGENESIS AND PATHOPHYSIOLOGY
(2003), available at http://www.acog.org/from-home/Misc/neonatalEncephalopathy.cfm.
This

approach could also be used to insulate from liability standardized treatment protocols, such as
not performing a CT scan in pediatric patients who suffer a minor closed head injury. See
generally Charles J. Homer & Lawrence Kleinman, The Management of Minor Closed Head
Injury in Children, 104 PEDIATRICS 1407 (1999) (discussing the treatment of head injuries in
children).
149. We do not presume to know how different institutions should weigh judgments,
settlements, claims, and complaints in deciding which providers and services require a quality
audit. We would predict that judgments and settlements are better signals of low quality care
than claims, and claims are a better signal of low quality than complaints. But, there is
considerable evidence that complaints, claims, and settlements are correlated with one another,
and their informational utility should not be ignored.
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F. Roll Back Past Tort Reforms
The effect of past tort reforms is to make malpractice cheaper
for potential defendants by reducing the frequency of lawsuits and the
amounts that must be paid to resolve them, while doing little about
the volatility of insurance premiums. 150
Considerable evidence
indicates that health care is not as safe as it should be. 151 Tort reform
reduces the incentive for providers to invest in measures that protect
patients from harm and exercise due care in their treatments. 152 If we
are going to have a tort system, we may as well use it to help address
the problem of low quality care. Repeal of past tort reforms is an
obvious place to start.
G. Basic Research v. TranslationalResearch
It is a truism in academic circles that the first finding of any
study is the need for more studies. Medical malpractice is already the
best studied area of the tort system, and most of the newer studies
reinforce existing findings. Yet, the findings of empirical research
have had little effect on the tort-reform debate. As Professor Bill Sage
observed:
At a recent conference on medical malpractice policy, a state legislator remarked with
some astonishment that the malpractice reform debate indeed seemed highly polarized,
but that most profound disagreement was not between health care providers and the
plaintiffs bar. The principal conflict he observed was between the major political
stakeholders on one side, and the academic community on the other. The former group
understood the central question to be the desirability of enacting MICRA-style measures
to discourage lawsuits and limit recoveries, with a $250,000 cap on non-economic
damages as its centerpiece. The latter group was essentially unanimous in its opinion
that traditional "tort reform" offers incomplete solutions to only a subset of critical
15 3
problems.

Given this gap, more attention needs to be paid to translational
research, so that what we know about the performance of the medical

150. Troyen A. Brennan & Michelle M. Mello, Patient Safety and Medical Malpractice: A
Case Study, 139 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 267, 271 (2003) ("Tort reform aims to decrease the
expected value of a case for plaintiffs attorneys, changing the calculus about when it is
worthwhile to bring a claim.").
151. See Hyman & Silver, Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution, supra note 1, at 893
("Health care error rates are higher than they should be."); see generally Brennan & Mello, supra
note 150 (discussing the tensions between the tort system and patient safety initiatives).
152. But cf Paul H. Rubin & Joanna Shepherd, Tort Reform and Accidental Deaths, Feb. 20,
2006, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=781424 (finding various tort reforms lead to fewer
accidental deaths).
153. William M. Sage, Understanding the First Malpractice Crisis of the 21st Century, in
HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK 1, 31-32 (Alice G. Gosfield ed., 2004).

20061

IT'S THE INCENTIVES, STUPID

1135

malpractice system will inform and shape the debate over what should
be done, instead of being ignored.
X. CONCLUSION

During the 1992 election, James Carville kept the Clinton
campaign focused and "on message" with a simple slogan: "It's the
economy stupid." Carville reportedly wrote these four words on a
whiteboard and showed it to (then-Governor, but soon-to-be President)
Clinton before every speech and event. Clinton hammered the Bush
(41) administration throughout the fall on the economy and won the
election. Carville's slogan demonstrates the power of a simple insight
in framing the terms of the debate.1 54 We do not expect "it's the
incentives, stupid" to have the same effect, but our slogan does have
significant potential to improve the performance of the liability system
and the health care sector. To ignore the power of the basic insight
that people avoid activities that cost them money and engage in
activities that make them money would be not just stupid, but
profoundly stupid.

154. It mattered not at all that the economy had come out of the recession in March, 1991.
See NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, NBER BUSINESS CYCLE DATING COMMITTEE
DETERMINES THAT RECESSION ENDED IN MARCH 1991, available at http://www.nber.org/March
91.html. Like the debate over tort reform, perception was more important than reality.
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